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Abstract 
In 2017, after protracted litigation between Māori iwi (tribe) and the Crown, the Whanganui River in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand was granted the status of a ‘legal person’. The river is described as an 
indivisible and living whole, so-called Te Awa Tupua. As a legal person, it includes all physical and 
metaphysical elements and has the right to flourish in order to maintain its health and wellbeing. Its 
interests are represented by two appointed ‘human faces’ and other actors including a strategy group. 
Potentially fraught with problems of misrepresentation, as well as a host of philosophical issues on 
speaking on behalf of an arguably “voiceless” and vulnerable actor, communicative problems arise 
how to actually politically represent a natural-cultural entity in practice. While the postcolonial 
context is unique and carries along dimensions of justice to the Māori, the development may also be 
understood against an ecocentric background. This includes the worldwide movement of earth 
jurisprudence, which advocates for giving rights and political agency to nature. We investigate by 
which epistemic and ontological claims the agency, and thereby the interests of the river are planned 
to be realised in the deliberative arena and inform policy.  
This thesis offers a qualitative, phenomenological study of how the different views on politically 
representing the river are juxtaposed, and how they are practically and communicatively manifested. 
In New Zealand we conducted eight semi-structured interviews with a selection of the appointed 
representative actors and the people who either appointed or advise them. A thematic analysis shows 
how the representative actors put an emphasis on a holistic view on, and a personal connection to the 
river, which both serve as a preferred moral relation in order to represent. Moreover, the concept of 
‘legal personhood’ gives further standing to the river, but brings about different connotations.  
The findings are theoretically deepened using (political) representation theory, which shows (1) a 
pre-political relation based on a ‘communicative ethic’, internalising the river’s interests and (2) a  
political representative practice making both the river’s interests and the relations to it present by a 
deliberative process. This is aimed to result in a sustainable, reciprocal relationship with the river. To 
conclude, this study offers an empirical exploration on how the recognition of the rights of nature are 
implemented and given meaning to, and shows the importance of discursive plurality and ethical 
relations on top of the legal aspect to bring about an ecocentric paradigm shift. 
Keywords: earth jurisprudence ; rights of nature ; political representation ; ecocentrism ; human-
nature communication ; representative relations ; river ; indigenous justice ; environmental justice ; 
communicative ethic ; thematic analysis ; New Zealand 
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Abbreviations and specific terms    
Aotearoa Māori name for New Zealand, literally The Land of the Long White 
Cloud 
hapū Māori subtribe 
hau Ethical Māori concept of gift giving and taking ; maintaining a 
reciprocal relation with nature (Henare 2001) 
iwi Māori tribe 
kaitiakitanga guardianship, a respectful way of interacting with the environment and 
maintaining a balance (Tipa 2009) 
legislation When there is agreement on a Settlement deal, New Zealand Parliament 
passes it into law, followed by the implementation process. Legislation 
regarding the Whanganui River’s legal status passed in 2017. 
mana Ethical Māori concept of power, authority and common good (Henare 
2001) 
Māori The indigenous peoples of New Zealand/Aotearoa, of Pacific descent 
mātauranga Knowledge 
Ngā Tāngata 
Tiaki o 
Whanganui 
Post-settlement governance body for the Whanganui iwi 
Settlement 
deal 
The resolution of a lawsuit between the Crown and a claimant group (in 
this case the Whanganui iwi). The Whanganui Settlement Deal passed in 
2014. 
TAT Te Awa Tupua  
Te Awa 
Tupua 
The Whanganui river as an indivisible whole (including all its physical 
and metaphysical aspects), now being a legal person 
Te Karewao The advisory group to Te Pou Tupua 
Te Kōpuka The strategy group which will develop a strategy document to guarantee 
the river’s (TAT’s) health and wellbeing 
Te Pou Tupua The ‘human faces’ of (rather than guardians, as the river is believed to 
be a guardian over the people as well) 
The Crown British Commonwealth 
TPT Te Pou Tupua  
Tupua Te 
Kawa 
The four intrinsic values forming the baseline of TAT’s legislation. (see 
Appendix 1) 
whakapapa Personal connection to an environmental entity (river, mountain) based 
on genealogy 
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He taonga nō te whenua me hoki anō ki te whenua 
What is given by the land should return to the land 
- Māori proverb 
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1 Introduction 
A worldwide, growing movement of recognising the rights of nature is emerging (Espinosa 
2017). The first major acknowledgement was the inclusion of nature’s rights within the 
Ecuadorian constitution in 2008 (Tanasescu 2014), and since then similar examples 
followed including Bolivia establishing eleven rights for nature or Mother Earth, which was 
also taken on by the UN Climate Talks in 20091. Such reforms were preceded by modest 
decrees giving humans and ENGOs legal standing on e.g., contesting policy on behalf of 
nature, as seen in the Aarhus Convention of 1998 (Jans & Marseille 2010). 
 
The Whanganui River flowing on the North Island of New Zealand/Aotearoa, was 
declared to be the world’s first river receiving the status of a legal person, after a protracted 
litigation process involving the Māori and British Commonwealth (the Crown) (Salmond 
2014). In March 2017, the national Parliament officially passed the final legislation, 
securing the new status of the river into law, ready to be implemented (New Zealand 
Parliamentary Counsel Office 2017). This historical event served as both a local and global 
example. Nationally, Mount Taranaki will receive a similar status as the Whanganui River2; 
and internationally India followed suit by declaring the Ganges and Yamuna rivers living 
human entities right after the New Zealand Bill was passed3. Moreover, the US4 and 
Australia5 are in the process of granting rivers legal rights as well. 
 
The Whanganui iwi (Māori tribe), sees the river as their spiritual ancestor. They define 
the Whanganui River as an indivisible and living whole, from the mountains to the sea, 
containing all its physical and metaphysical elements, named Te Awa Tupua (New Zealand 
Parliamentary Counsel Office 2017). The genealogical bonds between the Māori and the 
river are illustrated by the saying “I am the River, the River is me” (Ko au te awa. Ko te 
awa ko au), which symbolises the inseparable connection between all elements. This status 
is now embedded in law by the Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act in 2017 (ibid.). 
 
                                                            
1 The Guardian, Bolivia enshrines natural world's rights with equal status for Mother Earth: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/apr/10/bolivia-enshrines-natural-worlds-rights 
2 The Guardian, New Zealand gives Mount Taranaki same legal rights as a person: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/22/new-zealand-gives-mount-taranaki-same-legal-
rights-as-a-person 
3 BBC, India court gives sacred Ganges and Yamuna rivers human status: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-39336284 
4 The New York Times, Corporations Have Rights. Why Shouldn’t Rivers? 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/us/does-the-colorado-river-have-rights-a-lawsuit-seeks-to-
declare-it-a-person.html 
5 The Guardian, It's only natural: the push to give rivers, mountains and forests legal rights: 
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/apr/01/its-only-natural-the-push-to-give-rivers-
mountains-and-forests-legal-rights 
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Historically, when the British colonised New Zealand in the late 19th century, the river 
degraded ecologically by for example the extraction of minerals and exploitation for 
hydroelectric power (ibid.). The cultural ties of the Whanganui iwi were not recognised and 
their loss of control over their natural environment caused many grievances (Iorns 
Magallanes 2015). Arguably this may be a classical legacy of capitalism, alienating people 
from nature and commodifying the environment as parts, rather than view it as an 
interconnected whole (Harvey 1993). The new legislation is supposed to give compensation 
to the Māori, not only by ensuring “the health and well-being of the river” (New Zealand 
Parliamentary Counsel Office 2017), but also the possibility of representing the river’s 
rights and interests. Two people, jointly appointed by the iwi and the Crown, serve as the 
official ‘human faces’ of the river (Te Pou Tupua), supported by an advisory trust (Te 
Karewao). Furthermore, a strategy group (Te Kōpuka) was established, comprising 
different representatives with interests in the river (such as iwi, local authorities, as well as 
actors from different organisations and sectors). Their goal is to offer guidance in 
enhancing and maintaining the health and wellbeing of Te Awa Tupua by formulating a 
strategy document6 (New Zealand Parliamentary Counsel Office 2017). Furthermore, for 
the purpose of the Whanganui River Settlement, a post-settlement governance entity was 
established for the Whanganui iwi7. 
 
The phenomenon of giving legal status arguably symbolises the reconciliation of an 
indigenous cosmology with contemporary environmental jurisprudence. Indeed, the 
standing of natural objects (or now rather subjects) in relation to humans and their 
development is now contested, creating more space for nature’s rights and vice versa. The 
Māori concept of kaitiakitanga shows a deep connection to nature, based on “guardianship, 
protection, preservation and sheltering” (Te Ahukaramū Charles Royal 2018) and describes 
humans as not being superior to the natural world, but rather part of it by a reciprocal 
relationship (Iorns Magallanes 2015). This concept of legal rights is regarded as a ‘vehicle’ 
to rediscover these different nature-human relationships (Morris & Ruru 2010). Moreover, 
entitling the Whanganui River as a legal entity can be seen as a process of recognising these 
Māori concepts in water management (Harmsworth, Awatere & Robb 2016). It 
reconceptualises the definitions of what can be considered a legal person, challenging the 
human-centred status of the concept (Hutchison 2014), up until now mainly used for 
corporations, trusts and so forth. The unmooring of the legal personality concept from these 
human-centred contexts into the nature and environmental sphere presents a novel direction 
but is not without its conceptual and practical problems. 
 
                                                            
6 Appendix 2 gives a more elaborated overview of the different roles and Appendix 3 visualises the 
official representative structure 
7 Explanation given by the trust’s official web page: http://www.ngatangatatiaki.co.nz/?page_id=515 
Figure 1. Location of Whanganui river catchment on the North Island of New Zealand. 
Source: James Dignan 
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1.1 Problem formulation 
The representation of nature is subject to anthropocentric, political, philosophical, and 
communicative elements that render the process less than straightforward. For example, the 
Māori colonialist legacy and tensions around indigenous and environmental justice question 
whether the river representation is an effort mainly aimed at political reconciliation of a 
wronged minority, or ‘nature reconciliation’ aimed at restoring the health of an ecosystem. 
This question reasons from a modern human-nature divide, however this divide is not as 
prevalent in Māori cosmology. Anthropologist Anne Salmond (2014) explains that in the 
Māori ontological worldview nature and people are “bound together” (p. 294) and Tipa 
(2009) further argues that “no distinction is made between the inanimate and the animate or 
between abiotic and biotic” (p. 99). From a philosophical point of view, questions arise 
about whether we can ever apprehend and represent the interests of nature. Are the 
individual parts of the river considered or possibly scrutinised in favour of a holistic 
“personified sum total” (Cullinan 2011 see Tanasescu 2016, p. 118)? The recognition of 
this worldview and thereby the rights of nature, which in New Zealand is now taken into 
consideration, could possibly debunk this human-nature divide. Still, practical problems 
arise from this phenomenon: how do we actually represent and communicate with an 
aggregated entity, in this case a river including all its living organisms and communities, 
practically and with which legitimacy? Can this belief in nature as an agent be reconciled 
within a dominating Western legal framework?  
 
Within the growing rights of nature movement there is a strong call of recognising 
nature’s agency, however differing views coexist on how this representation should be 
realised. Overall, the central problem here is that if we accept nature’s agency legally and 
politically by rights, there are multiple ways of knowing and deciding upon what it wants 
and judge who is capable and legitimised to know, which will be further elaborated on in 
the theoretical framework. The Whanganui case has been chosen to illustrate this problem 
for (1) the legitimised status of nature and its agency by law and (2) its clarity on which 
individuals and groups represent the natural entity, as opposed to other cases which have 
been placed in rights of nature movement (Tanasescu 2016, p. 123).    
1.2 Research aim and questions 
Earlier research on Te Awa Tupua’s development has been mainly written from a law 
perspective. The legal aspects of (earlier versions) of the Settlement Bill are claimed to 
rather implicate a compensation of the Māori community rather than the rights of nature 
alone (Strack 2017). Still, Barraclough (2013) concludes that the social implications should 
be further researched upon, in which we see rights of nature not solely as a legal movement, 
but rather as a social-symbolic one. Now the legislation is established, which social 
implications do the representative actors want to carry out? 
 
Our research aim is to identify and juxtapose different kinds of views on political 
representation within representing the Whanganui River now it is considered a legal person 
(Te Awa Tupua). Following this aim, we identify and discuss the conceptions about the 
representative processes and their implications for realising rights of nature in this case. 
Within these management processes we also analyse how the representatives understand 
their perspectives as voices of the river based on their personal, organisational, and 
professional backgrounds, and how these actors with different views of the river collaborate 
in the representative process. To assist this aim, we give an overview of central concepts of 
a more ecocentric discourse before elaborating on political representation theory, which 
guides us how actors within this new framework phenomenologically make sense of the 
river’s representation in practice (e.g. roles, criteria, and claims). 
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Our main research question is distilled from the aim as follows: 
 
How, and with what ethical and communicative implications, is the Whanganui 
River (Te Awa Tupua) planned to be politically represented as a legal person when 
implementing the legislation? 
 
We investigate this phenomenologically from the perspective of those formally involved 
with representing it, interpreting it, and communicating its wishes. The following sub-
questions (SQs) assist us in answering the main question: 
 
• SQ1: Which different (epistemological and ontological) worldviews or 
knowledge systems regarding the river (nature) can be identified and how do 
they cooperate? 
• SQ2: Which (moral) relations are deemed to be important to represent Te Awa 
Tupua?  
• SQ3: Which representative criteria are identified?  
• SQ4: Which communicative practicalities and challenges emerge? 
 
Moreover, throughout the thesis we aim to reflectively put the findings in the discourse of 
granting rights to nature and earth jurisprudence, before making final implications at the 
end of this work.  
 
In each of these questions we identify possible opportunities and challenges regarding the 
future implementation process of TAT’s legislation. Chronologically, SQ 1 will be 
addressed in section 5.1, SQ 2 in section 5.2, and both SQ 3 and SQ 4 will be elaborated on 
in section 5.4. Within the following Analysis (Chapter 6), the questions come together by 
offering (critical) implications that are theoretically explored, followed by a visualisation of 
an abstracted representative cycle as interpreted by our findings. 
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2 Ecocentrism across fields: a brief overview  
In the ethics and law fields, concepts such as land ethic (Leopold 1949) and earth 
jurisprudence (Cullinan 2011 see Tanasescu 2014) claim natural entities have interests and 
preferences which, by acknowledging their juridical existence, can be politically and legally 
enforced and expressed (Stone 1972). This rationale arguably empowers the notion of 
nature having (independent) agency rather than seeing it purely as a resource to exploit, 
even though Tanasescu (2014) emphasises there is a grey area between both definitions8.  
 
A traditional distinction in environmental ethics, regarding human relations to nature, is 
made between a utilitarian-anthropocentric, and an ecocentric approach9. The utilitarian 
approach can be argued to be anthropocentric, in which nature serves human purposes; 
whereas an ecocentric approach sees nature and natural entities as having their own 
intrinsic values (Norton 1991; Thompson & Barton 1994). 
Berry (2006) argues that in modern times, nature is not part of human’s physical and 
psychological beings anymore. People have lost their connection to the natural world, 
creating a human-nature divide which should be dissolved to avoid human moral 
exceptionalism (Schillmoller & Pelizzon 2013). This legal movement is conceptualised as 
earth jurisprudence (Berry 2006, Cullinan 2011).  
Much of the earth jurisprudence discourse uses the concept of reciprocity, in which the 
earth sustains all living beings, centralising its mutual dependence and giving “formal 
recognition to the reciprocal relationship between humans and the rest of nature” (Filguiera 
& Mason 2009, p. 3). Similarly, in Māori ethics the concept of hau is prevalent, symbolised 
as the “breath of life” (Salmond 2014 p. 292) or the “ethic of spiritual power of obligatory 
reciprocity in relationships of nature” (Henare 2001 p. 213)10. Culturally, it “was 
established as a complex totalising system of obligatory gift exchange infusing Māori 
social, economic, and religious life with profound implications for the management and 
guardianship of the natural world” (ibid.), but this approach was interrupted due to the 
colonial history of New Zealand, using rather Cartesian dualist, scientific thinking within 
natural resource management (a.a., pp. 211-212). 
 
 
                                                            
8 The author criticises the comparison by rights of nature advocates that the liberation of nature is 
similar to the liberation of slaves. If a human is owned in any possible way (even when taken good 
care of), then that is a harm in itself, as an abuse of her/his dignity. However, if you own a piece of 
land (such as a forest) and you take good care of it, does this necessarily mean you harm its dignity? 
9 However, from an animal ethics perspective, Singer (1975) identifies utilitarianism not as 
anthropocentric per se, as he claims it encompasses all sentient beings, being subject to the same 
rights. 
10 The concept of hau has a multilayered definition. For a detailed description, we would like to refer 
to: Henare, M. (2001) Tapu, Mana, Mauri,Hau, Wairua: A Māori philosophy of vitalism and cosmos. 
In J. Grimm (ed.): Indigenous Traditions and Ecology: The Interbeing of Cosmology and Community. 
pp. 197 - 22 
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Granting rights to nature should result in a more ethical treatment of natural entities 
(Tanasescu 2014). However, only inclusion in the legal arena is not enough, as it also asks 
for more representation in political decision-making processes (ibid.). This means, in effect, 
that nature is given both positive as well as negative rights. The author also states that 
contemporary political representation is increasingly mediated by claiming rights: this 
“hegemony of rights’ in the political discourse is explained as having a certain “moral 
appeal” in today’s lack of trust in (national) governments, making the boundaries of what 
represents non-humans blurred (Tanasescu 2016, pp. 51-52). When a subject is owed 
justice, rights are recognised, and non-humans are generally not considered things anymore 
(a.a., p. 61). Hence, attribution of rights in a legal political discourse is seen as central to 
instilling moral obligations toward the rights-holder, nature in this case. The challenge of 
legally enforcing and representing natural entities was brought up by Stone back in 1972. 
He argues that when someone (being humans, companies and in this case a natural entity) is 
incompetent to manage their own legal affairs, a guardian, or trustee (terminology may 
vary) is given authority by court to represent the rights of the entity in their name, granting 
standing in their own right. 
 
Linking the field of environmental democracy to environmental communication, Peterson 
et al. (2007) lead their analysis by following Leopold (1949)’s concept of land ethic. The 
authors call upon the field of environmental communication to facilitate a more inclusive 
egalitarian land-community, which has the responsibility to develop ways of translating 
voices of non-humans, such as natural entities. With our thesis, we take on the challenge, 
“to interrogate the human relationship with and ethics toward nature as mediated through 
communication practices and ideologies” (Cox 2007), in our case, as embedded in 
(political) representation praxis of the Whanganui river. 
Consequently, we use (political) representation as a key concept in bridging the human-
nature dichotomy. We conceptualise representation from a traditional, anthropocentric 
perspective before problematising the difficulties of applying this to a nature representation 
context and how it serves as conveying a (moral) relation.  
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3 Theoretical framework 
Political representation is not a new concept. In any larger, complex society that cannot be 
coordinated based on direct participation or shared norms, speaking on behalf of someone 
else, for example a constituency, helps realise the rights and interests of those who cannot 
or choose not to participate (Burke 1776/1906). Politicians become their mouthpieces, and 
they can check the validity of their representation by contesting their claims or voting for 
someone else (Sawer 1998). Hence, such representatives are accountable on a transparent 
level, at least in well-functioning democracies (Pitkin 1967). However, there seems to be a 
general difficulty in ascribing legal and political rights and representatives to non-human 
entities (Garner 2013). The author describes that they cannot express their preferences on a 
linguistic level, contest claims or vote. We explain how other authors try to expand the 
boundaries of what is considered (political) nature-human communication. 
 
The following chapter helps us define how the representatives that are involved within 
the Whanganui case make sense of their roles and make claims about their representation 
processes regarding the river as a legal person (and the accompanying challenges or 
normative statements involved). We offer an overview of its theoretical definitions, 
assumptions, (anthropocentric) limitations and communicative challenges within the 
deliberative arena. 
Our theoretical framework is three-fold. Firstly, we explain aspects of classical political 
representation theory, to illustrate the formal characteristics of the Whanganui case being 
embedded in legislation; as we deem them important regarding the formal (legal) nature of 
the case. Secondly, we argue that, in order to enfranchise nature’s interests, the discussion 
whether nature is considered to be voiceless or not should be elaborated on, using a non-
anthropocentric context. Finally, we illustrate a rather relational view on representation 
(concerning the representation of nature and its difficulties regarding enfranchising its 
interests), which shows the classical view is inadequate and needs to be revised.  
We argue that representation should be an evolving concept that increases its scope 
following the gradual attribution of rights to marginal cases, starting with women, the 
disabled, persons of colour, animals, and the environment. This is consistent with the aim 
for mitigation of both social and natural injustice, which is also present in for example the 
climate justice movement (Schlosberg & Collins 2014). 
3.1 Classical representation: formal criteria 
A classical theory of representation is offered by Pitkin (1967), who defines the concept as 
the process of representatives making the absent present (again) in the political arena (p. 
81). Political representation happens when political actors make claims, act in the name of 
others, symbolise or advocate for particular interests. Moreover, the author distinguishes 
representation as ‘standing for’ (describing, mapping, or symbolising certain ethical values 
for example) and representation as ‘acting for’, literally acting or speaking on behalf of the 
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constituent. Still, these implications invite further questions. For example, on which basis 
representatives have the means to represent and to which standards? How can a 
representative actor maintain a balance between being an independent agent with individual 
interests versus mediating the constituent’s interest, leaving the definition quite vexed? 
Pitkin further argues that by distinguishing which view of representation is explored, 
these differences in conceptualisation can be partially conciliated. She identifies four kinds 
of representation: formalistic, symbolic, descriptive, and substantive. In short, formalistic 
representation stands for the formal arrangements representation, made up by (1) 
authorisation (why the representative got appointed) and (2) accountability (the 
responsiveness of the constituent being able to give feedback). Secondly, descriptive 
representation depicts the similarity between the representatives and the “average” of the 
represented. Thirdly, substantive representation defines the activity of the representatives to 
represent the interests of the constituent. Lastly, symbolic representation stands for the 
subjective perceptions taken from the participant’s perspective, which are embedded in for 
example the meanings representatives have regarding those being represented. To give a 
common environmental example, climate change is often represented by the symbol of a 
polar bear standing on a melting iceberg, which assumes a ‘standing for’ relation rather 
than an ‘acting for’ relation between the representative (the image of a polar bear) and the 
represented (the climate) when such a symbol is used (Boström & Uggla 2016). On the 
other hand, ‘acting for’ considers conceptualisations of, for example, standards of consent 
and legitimacy. 
3.2 Criticising anthropocentrism in representing nature 
Building on the human-centred classical theorists before, other scholars bring more 
difficulties to the representation concept when applying it to nature. Non-human beings are 
often perceived as voiceless and therefore unable to legitimise or present their own interests 
or concerns. 
Goodin (1996) argues in favour of enfranchising nature’s interests, whereby the 
representation of nature’s interests by others is necessarily required. This however brings 
up certain complications. It is the question for example whether the representation of 
nature’s rights (by a guardian) is the right way of enfranchising nature, as the interest of 
one agent is internalised in that of another, whereas the democratic maxim is an “equal 
consideration of interests” (a.a., p. 837). 
Still, Eckersley (1999) argues for special discursive procedures based on defensible 
morality claims, for which proxy-representatives and guardians are insurmountably 
necessary. She declares the flaws of nature-human communication (as problematised within 
Habermas’ discourse ethic) to be “arbitrary”. She observes that the problems of 
representation affect any context, human as well as nonhuman, and that this should not be 
an excuse to withhold such rights for the latter. O’Neill (2001) wonders with what kind of 
legitimacy nature can (theoretically and practically) speak in the deliberative arena as well. 
Similar to Pitkin, the author demarcates three sources of representative legitimacy, being 
(1) authorisation and democratic accountability, (2) presence (representatives must have 
shared identity with the constituencies) and (3) epistemic values (knowledge and judgment 
claims by humans). Still, he argues only the latter is possible when representing nature, as 
he claims humans cannot have a direct dialogue with nature and poses that a careful 
combination of science, expertise and discourse should be used in place of this.  
3.2.1 Nature as a marginalised and ’voiceless’ actor 
Other contemporary theories take on representation of historically disadvantaged groups. 
Feminist and decolonial theory has been used to criticise who speaks on behalf of whom 
(Mohanty 2003). Here, one cautions about further subjectification and recolonisation of 
others’ perspectives by prescribing certain views to them. Further, in the context of political 
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equality, Williams (1998) distinguishes three dimensions of the concept, being dynamics of 
legislative decision-making, the nature of constituency-representative relations, and the 
principles for assembling citizens into their respective constituencies, summarised as voice, 
trust and memory. The voice aspect argues for not only the enfranchisement of 
(marginalised) groups, but also for political equality and their representation to secure their 
“distinctive substantive interests in politics” (p. 74). She further argues that people outside 
of the (marginalised) group do not have the full knowledge of their interests and concerns, 
and therefore the group itself should be present within the political representative process. 
Building onto this emancipatory justice movement, Wong (2009) uses Rawl’s (1993) moral 
personhood theory to critically advance cognitively disabled persons’ rights for moral 
consideration, even though being unable to speak within deliberative processes. She claims 
non-human entities could receive the ‘moral treatment’ in political deliberation as well, 
despite their communicative difficulties. 
 
To conclude, nature arguably can be recognised as an (aggregated) marginalised group of 
individuals, similar to women, ethnic minorities, disabled individuals, and animals, having 
the right for an extension of democracy’s boundaries (Matarrese 2010). The Whanganui 
River has extensively been polluted and exploited for human-use and can be considered 
equally mute in its ability to contest policy or advocate for its interests. In our data analysis 
we show whether the Whanganui River is indeed considered mute by the different 
representative actors, and how this is (morally and practically) expected to be dealt with. 
3.2.2 ‘Extending’ communication to the natural world 
Some authors do not only emphasise that nature should be emancipated to be part of the 
representative constituency but go a step further by not deeming it voiceless, recognising 
and exploring communicative possibilities with nature as well. This is arguably in 
agreement with the deeply rooted relationship of indigenous people around the world with 
their environment (Gray, 1991; Stevens, 1998 see Tipa 2009, p. 97). By taking nature’s 
agency into account, implications on how this communication can serve as a baseline for 
representation is explored. 
In the literature on political representation of animals, scholars relatedly note how 
animals – while bereft of speech – can communicate basic preferences that we can use to 
determine their interests (Meijer 2013). In effect, they ‘vote with their feet’, as far as they 
can clearly express opposition. On this view, a river’s drying up feedbacks a 
communication that current actions are harmful and need to be revised. While the literature 
on human-nature communication is nascent and often criticised (Milstein 2012), most of 
empiral literature found tends to describe this spiritual, phenomenological communication 
as valid, and our inability to ‘hear’ such calls are part of a critique on the Western 
monopoly on communication to be narrowly linguistic and rational. In this way, they join 
up with some key refrains of decolonial feminist theory (Mohanty 2003). 
Further contributions to this body of literature include Homestead (2014), who argues 
that by listening to nature and recognising its “voice”, humans are able to represent it 
properly, by combining scientific-naturalistic, spiritual, aesthetic/poetic, and critical ways 
of perception and experience, which is conceptualised by Carbaugh (2007) as a “discursive 
diversity” (p. 70). It can be argued this pluralist standpoint is similar to what Salmond 
(2014) describes as interweaving different ontological world views (being Māori and 
Western) within water management processes in New Zealand, in which these worldviews 
coexist and collaborate rather than being merged, and arguably ‘mixed and matched’. 
 
From a poststructuralist point of view, in order to acknowledge nature’s agency, humans 
must consider it as a ‘conversational partner’ (Cheney 1989). Haraway (1991) also 
emphasises, from an ecofeminist approach, the need to recognise nature’s agency to debunk 
the repressive human-nature dichotomy. 
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Except of only theoretically recognising nature as a communicative agent, other authors 
exemplify this in practice, studying spiritual connections embedded in their indigenous 
cultures (Carbaugh 1999; Kunisue 2014). Even though these cases illustrate some sort of 
“transhuman dialogue”, Peters (1999) calls these phenomenological explanations of 
dialogue illusionary, and rather rationally defines communication with non-humans as 
imprecise sending of signals, with no promise for (dialogical) reciprocity to happen. It is 
interesting to see how, quite contrary to Peters, the latter concept acts as a baseline for the 
earth jurisprudence movement. But how is reciprocity given meaning to and is manifested 
in the praxis of giving rights to nature? Does it make nature a communicative partner with a 
political agency or not? 
     Francis & Silvers (2007) try to blur the boundaries of who is having political agency 
by their description of how traditionally defined dependent agents (such as voiceless 
beings) do have some kind of ‘dependent agency’. Building on Rawls’ primary conceptions 
of the good and Nussbaum’s concept of benevolence-knowing trustees, the authors believe 
every actor (even considered voiceless) should be able to amplify their conceptions of the 
individual good. Hereby, they note that agency of this matter of the good is not “an all or 
nothing concept” (a.a., p. 331), but rather based on interactive social scripts co-constructed 
in society being (partly) dependent on others. Examples of how to include these actors 
within the deliberative justice debate are nonverbal expressions of preference (a.a., p. 325). 
 
Similarly, Dryzek (1990) proposes a “communicative ecological ethic” as an 
experimental practice within a “greener” political arena. However, he bases this concept on 
human perceptions of feedback of nature, debunking both instrumental notions of 
rationality and ecological spirituality, but still acknowledging nature’s communicative 
competences. He argues instrumental rationality implies hierarchical domination of certain 
post-Enlightenment values, whereas a holistic, spiritual approach encompasses difficulties 
to implement (how does it practically empower an ecological-political transition?) and 
involves dangers of becoming “totalitarian”. Indeed, this could be a problem if one person 
unilaterally claims to ‘channel’ nature. A non-instrumental rationale based on local, non-
generalised communication by contrast would incorporate nature’s signs into human 
political discourse and engender discussion of (ecological) assumptions.  
 
Overall, theoretical contributions to the problem of representing nature, ranges from 
universal discursive claims based on morality (Eckersley 1999), to epistemic reasoning 
based on care (O’Neill 2001, 2006) to solidarity with non-humans by precursory 
internatural communication (Von Essen & Allen 2017). However, Tanasescu (2016) would 
rather see this as a step in the direction of self-perception and self-understanding, which is 
at the core of a relational view on political representation, which will be explained next. 
3.3 Relational view on representation 
The classical representation theories focusing on a referential view (how the representative 
mirrors interests of the constituency), as presented by authors such as Pitkin, are limited as 
not all representatives are elected by a constituency. In some (global) representative cases, 
territorial delineations appear (Dobson 1996) but can be considered irrelevant (Tanasescu 
2016). We illustrate a relational view, which shows the performative process of 
representation and shows how a representative conveys a (preferred) relation when making 
claims. 
 
Turning away from the classical, democratically elected representative-constituency 
model, Saward (2006) rather emphasises a constructivist approach of representation, in 
which the representative’s role in shaping claims and identities of the represented is 
analysed, rather than representation as just a formal establishment and result of elections. 
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Hereby, the performative relations between representative and the represented are taken 
central. This dynamic relationship is embedded in a so-called representative claim as a 
representative activity, which is shaped up by the elements of Maker-Subject-Object-
Referent-Audience (Saward 2009). A maker of representations (M) brings to the fore a 
subject (S) which stands for the object of what he or she thinks to represent (O) which 
shows a certain relation as a referent (R) which is finally offered to an audience (A). The 
strength of this relationary model according to the author is that “it invites us to look 
closely at the impact of a broad range of representative claimants, asking how, why and 
whom they represent (if anyone), without our very definitions determining whether and to 
what extent they constitute cases of representation (a.a p. 4)”. Overall, it serves the purpose 
of analysing the “reflections and practices” of the representatives (Boström, Uggla & 
Hansson 2017), rather than judging the static categories what it is constituted of, such as 
legitimacy, accountability, authorisation, and so forth. 
 
Saward’s constructivist approach helps us to identify the co-constructed character of the 
claims and roles involved within the Whanganui case, being a representative cultural 
phenomenon (Saward 2006), rather than only being legally embedded within formal 
arrangements. Building on Saward, Tanasescu (2016) also turns away from this referential 
view of translating and mirroring based on “coalesced interests” (a.a p. 8-9) and defines it 
as a rather relational view of representation. He adds it encompasses summoning a 
preferred relation into being with whom or what is intended to be represented (a.a., p. 14). 
Derived from this relational process, two layers can be identified being (1) the privileged 
spokesperson which proclaims a semblance of unity with what is represented and (2) the 
constant activity of claim-making tightens the relationship between the representative, as 
political subject, to herself (a.a., pp. 16-17). Despite the interest-language (that is often 
recurring within representation theory) still being considered relevant to Tanasescu, it is 
rather epiphenomenal, or a by-product of representation, since the emphasis is on the 
summoned relation by making a representative claim.  
All in all, Tanasescu (2016) emphasises the dynamic process of the representative 
practice as relying “on linguistic summoning-into-being, aided by ontological claims” (pp. 
19-20) and hereby the representative defines her or himself, what she/he tries to represent 
and the relation between both. This is supported by a revised definition of what a 
representative claim actually involves, which is elaborated on as “a particular way of 
talking about representation that emphasises what I and others believe is the most salient 
aspect of the phenomenon. (p. 31)”. The author connects giving rights (to natural 
phenomena) as being part of this claim-making activity, showing our relationship with non-
humans/nature, rather than being a result of an ‘impossible’ congruence or responsiveness 
which traditionally defines representation, as problematised before by the likes of Goodin 
(1996) and O’Neill (2001). 
 
To conclude, we maintain that classical representation theory is rather anthropocentric, 
since it could be hard to ‘measure’ classical concepts such as accountability and legitimacy 
when nature is conceived to be ‘voiceless’ in the deliberative arena (O’Neill 2001). 
However, keeping in mind the legal-formal character of the case, we argue it gives space to 
the representative actors to give meaning to these concepts nonetheless. We also recognise 
the notion that nature can give communicative feedback (to a certain extent) within the 
context of both decolonising different (indigenous) worldviews, as well as by considering 
nature’s signs in a (Western) ‘rational’ communicative ethic (Dryzek 1990). 
In our analysis, we operationalise parts of the different theories and conceptualisations of 
the aforementioned authors to analyse a broader spectrum of how representation is given 
meaning to and shaped in the Whanganui case.  
Overall, we focus on both the formal aspects of classical representation theory, as well as 
relational view describing the structure of the representative practice identified, which is 
supported by interests and ethical commitments.   
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4 Methodology 
The methodology of this study is driven by a phenomenological approach as it is “the 
participants’ perceptions, feelings, and lived experiences” (Guest, MacQueen, Namey 2011 
p. 13) that form the main unit of analysis. However, we abstracted and organised them by 
interpersonal themes using a thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke 2006). We describe step by 
step how our data collection is carried out. 
4.1 Data collection 
The main method of data collection of this research consists of semi-structured in-depth 
interviews, comprising both questions created before the interviews as part of an interview 
guide and questions emerging during the interviews themselves (Creswell 2015). Other 
forms of data collection are comprised of preparatory data gathering, including the 
overview of ecocentrism across fields (Chapter 2). We also analysed relevant articles of 
the Whanganui case itself and similar cases. We used these writings to better illustrate 
certain arguments but decided to leave most of the argumentation to the description of the 
interviewees to retain grounding in phenomenology. Furthermore, we held approximately 
five informal talks during our fieldwork. 
 
To get a fuller understanding of the situated meaning of the Whanganui river, and the 
important personal connection it has for the community, we felt the need to conduct the 
majority of the data collection in the relevant area, rather than performing only desk 
research and/or interviews on distance, giving justice to the local, phenomenological aspect 
of the case and our research. We conducted the interviews in New Zealand/Aotearoa from 
the 23rd of February until the 9th of March. The interviews mainly took place in the city of 
Whanganui, the biggest city along the river situated at its mouth, as well as in Palmerston 
North (headquarters of the involved local government) and Wellington (the capital). 
4.1.1 Phase 1: Preparatory data collection 
Although we consider the conduction of interviews as our main method of data collection, 
we sought support in external sources. To get an overview of the Whanganui case, we 
globally analysed the official public act and video recordings of the Third Reading of the 
Bill to get an overview of the political and legal discourse surrounding the case. 
Furthermore, to get more background information, we kept track of news articles that 
focused on developments within the Whanganui case and rights of nature movement in 
general. This was done by irregular intervals depending on when news emerged. We also 
conducted an interview with a member of the rights of nature movement in Sweden (part of 
ecopsychology organisation Lodyn) and End Ecocide Sweden and attended a discussion 
about rights of nature facilitated by another member of Lodyn. These two activities gave us 
more understanding of the rights of nature movement around the world and provided an 
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opening to the case in New Zealand. It also gave us some insight regarding the connection 
between indigenous people and nature and how this is a vital element for the rights of 
nature movement. In like manner, to get familiar with the culture, we asked for a 
consultation with a researcher that has conducted multiple research projects involving 
Māori. One of the things she advised is to establish trust and personal relations, which 
made us form a strategy to establish certain contacts before we went to New Zealand but 
once we were there we used snowball sampling (Bryman 2012) to get more contacts. To 
ensure interviews beforehand we started doing online research on the appointed 
representatives, finding contacts for example by browsing application links concerning the 
recruitment of representatives for the strategy group (Te Kōpuka). At the end of 2017 we 
started contacting potential interviewees with formal emails, sometimes including a 
recommendation letter of our supervisor as a supporting document. 
4.1.2 Phase 2: Interviews and field work 
The interviews were conducted with a selection of people within the a priori identified 
representative bodies of the river and/or involved by taking a purposive sample (Bryman 
2012) within the different legislative framework bodies, focusing on (a) people who got 
appointed for a representative role and (b) people who were involved in appointing 
representatives or advise them. 
The approached groups consist of the (1) the human faces of the river or direct 
representatives (Te Pou Tupua), (2) a strategy group (Te Kōpuka) involving different 
stakeholders with a certain interest in the river and (3) an advisory trust to the human faces 
(Te Karewao). The (appointers of) representative actors of these groups can be identified 
following Pitkin’s (1967) concept of formalistic representation, being institutionalised: we 
have chosen these persons as most relevant to interview based on their legal responsibility 
of (in)directly representing the river’s interests. 
 
The formulation of the interview guide (Appendix 4) started a month before the 
fieldwork and was put through an iterative process of revision. The guide comprised 3 main 
themes, corresponding the interviewees background and personal connection to the river, 
the different roles and responsibilities within the legislation and how this phenomenon can 
be replicated and compared to the rights of nature movement. Although, the themes were 
always maintained, the questions varied depending on the interviewee (based on their exact 
role) and the content the interviewees themselves brought to the fore, showing the semi-
structured nature of this method. 
Other methods such as observation were considered but would be more suitable when 
actual meetings between members of the strategy group would be planned already and more 
interactive processes would be in place, which was not yet the case (to our understanding). 
Instead, we decided to go deeper into the preliminary thoughts on the representative claims, 
connecting them to the (political) representative theory presented before to be able to 
deduce symbolic, ethical, and ontological frameworks and normative claims from the 
interviews. Hence, the interviews had an anticipatory disposition where the expectations of 
representatives constituted the principal data. 
 
Six out of eight interviews conducted in New Zealand were arranged beforehand, and two 
were arranged on the spot using the previously mentioned snowball sampling, asking 
interviewees for other contacts they deemed relevant for our research. The interviews lasted 
between 40 and 80 minutes, except for one as the concerned interviewee had less time for 
us than anticipated. All interviews were recorded with the consent of the interviewees, 
except of one due to a technical failure. Below we present an overview of all interviewees: 
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Table 1. Overview of the interviewees 
Name Relevant function/role Location Date Recorded 
Interviewee 1 Representative appointed 
by the Regional Council 
for the river’s strategy 
group (Te Kōpuka), was a 
Green Party candidate for 
the Central Government 
elections, works for an iwi 
Whanganui 23-02-2018 Yes 
Interviewee 2 Group Manager Strategy 
& Regulation of Horizons 
Regional Council -
  responsible for 
appointing members on 
the strategy group 
Palmerston 
North 
26-02-2018 Yes 
Interviewee 3 Strategic advisor on the 
Department of 
Conservation, which has a 
member on the strategy 
group (Te Kōpuka) 
Whanganui 01-03-2018 Yes 
Interviewee 4 Tourism representative on 
strategy group (Te 
Kōpuka) 
Whanganui 02-03-2018 No 
Interviewee 5 Fish & Game Council 
representative on strategy 
group (Te Kōpuka) 
Whanganui 06-03-2018 Yes 
Interviewee 6 Chair of the main 
Whanganui iwi 
governance body (Ngā 
Tāngata Tiaki o 
Whanganui), facilitates 
appointment of iwi 
representatives on strategy 
group 
Whanganui 06-03-2018 Yes 
Interviewee 7 Member of the advisory 
group (Te Karewao) to the 
human faces (Te Pou 
Tupua) 
Whanganui 07-03-2018 Yes 
Interviewee 8 Former Minister of 
Waitangi (Māori Treaty 
Settlements). Was 
involved in the 
appointment of the human 
faces (Te Pou Tupua) 
Wellington 09-03-2018 Yes 
4.1.3 Referral to interviewees 
It was anticipated beforehand that the interviewees would be easy to track down in certain 
cases, as their roles are very specific within this legislation. Hence, we have asked consent 
of the interviewees’ full names, official position and their (literal) utterances to be used in 
this thesis. However, by reflecting throughout the research process, we later stated that this 
research does not pose the aim to show how individual interviewees are thinking about 
representation, but we rather distinguish “themes across the body of participants as a 
whole” (Josselson 2007 see Pickering & Kara 2017, pp. 300-301). That is why we decided 
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to refer to the interviewees semi-anonymously in-text (as their roles can still be tracked 
down), rather than using ‘personal’ full names. It can be argued this objectifies the 
interviewees more and silences minorities in a decolonial context (Moore 2012 see a.a., p. 
301). Yet, it does not ‘personally confront’ them and still maintains the readability for the 
audience (instead of referring to the interviewees by their full representative role). Still, the 
role of the representative body the individual belongs to or their field (such as conservation, 
tourism, local government) can still be seen in the above table, giving clarity of the relevant 
functions of the interviewees within this legislation. 
We realise we do not only frame what the representatives think about representing the 
river and anonymise them, but by this we offer a composite representation (as in 
aggregated) of them, by analysing the data thematically and juxtapose and abstract them in 
the results. 
4.1.4 Complimentary data: informal field work 
Apart from conducting interviews during the field trip, we have also had informal 
conversations with people living in and/or visiting Whanganui, while visiting the city and 
taking part in recreational activity on the river. Although we decided not to include the data 
in our primary (thematically) analysed results (as they would in comparison be very brief 
and superficial compared to the interviews), we include certain remarks and opinions when 
relevant in the discussion, offering certain critical notes or alternative perspectives as 
context. Informal talks with other people in the area also helped to provide a more complete 
picture of the studied context, including apprehensions and expectations around the new 
legislation and legal status. Furthermore, we continued one interview with an informal talk, 
to which two iwi individuals were invited who are working with Te Urewera Settlement, 
which has similar implications to the Whanganui case regarding giving legal personhood 
status to a natural-cultural phenomenon in Aotearoa/New Zealand (see Iorns Magallanes 
2015). These were particularly helpful in getting more critical public remarks about the 
TAT legislation and insights in similar institutional arrangements. 
4.2 Data analysis 
After the interviews were conducted and transcribed, this research follows a thematic 
analysis as formulated by Braun & Clarke (2006). The authors argue this process consists 
of distinguishing analytical themes, portraying and categorising the meanings of the 
collective data set, relevant to the research question. With our thematic analysis, we take a 
latent approach, which means we focus on the interpretative, underlying assumptions that 
emerge from the data, rather than semantic approach which would focus solely on the 
explicit descriptions offered by the interviewees, in which the analysis “is not just 
description, but is already theorised” (ibid., p. 13). However, in our Results (chapter 5) we 
limit to discussing the interviewees’ descriptions adding a level of interpretation, whereas 
in the following Analysis (chapter 6) we more explicitly link to a selection of the theories 
juxtaposed before. This has been decided upon to let the ‘interviewees speak’ (without 
losing sight of the research aim) before the theoretical abstraction is performed. The authors 
offer six potential stages of the analysis process, which we have operationalised. These 
stages consist of (1) familiarising yourself with your data, (2) generating initial codes, (3) 
searching for themes, (4) reviewing themes, (5) defining and naming themes and (6) 
producing the report (Braun & Clarke 2006, pp. 16-23). Codes were defined based on either 
pre-established formal representative components (authorisation, accountability, or other 
criteria) and emerging topics that came up in the interviews and seemed to define the 
representative practice (e.g. the holistic worldview, personal connections, reciprocity, 
collaborative challenges). 
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The interview transcripts offered us certain attitudes and claims regarding the 
representation of TAT. Despite the preliminary character of the case’s implementation, we 
argue that these statements influence discourse, condition expectations and structure future 
action, for example surrounding the upcoming strategy and decision-making processes and 
are for this reason valuable to analyse and elaborate on. In addition to substantive claims, 
we focused on the choice of interviewees’ vocabulary to illustrate the river and granting it 
legal personhood, as language can reveal individuals’ innate attitudes and understandings 
(Smith 2004). 
 
4.3 Limitations 
We have not been able to interview either of the two “human faces” of the river (Te Pou 
Tupua) due to their busy schedules of currently collecting information about the river’s 
status from diverse stakeholders, particularly the iwi. We realise, because of this, we are 
missing the perspective of two very important actors within the legislation’s 
implementation whose inclusion may have yielded more elaborated or nuanced 
conclusions. Still, we received information on the roles and values of these actors through 
the interviewees who work have worked closely with them, and by that we partly fill this 
gap. This is so, because these representatives will not work in a vacuum: they are 
accountable to and in collaboration with the interviewees of this study, and the latter’s ideas 
and expectations are likely to condition what these representatives can and cannot do. 
 
Another limitation identified when approaching interviewees is the preliminary stage of 
the implementation of the Settlement. Even though it is indicated in the public act that 
members of the strategy group (Te Kōpuka) needed to be appointed within three months 
after the signing of the Bill, this has not been the case. We found that the iwi go through a 
longer process of selection11 for the strategy group (Te Kōpuka) and advisory trust (Te 
Karewao), which is why we talked to a larger proportion of non-iwi representatives, of 
which some were selected already by the time of our field work. In the time we reached out 
to people involved, we found out that the majority was not selected yet and we ended up 
talking to members, which had been publicly appointed, rather than taking a sample of 
some sort of all 17 members. However, not construing it as solely a limitation, we consider 
the anticipatory and expecting answers from interviewees as valuable data on its own as 
this both reflects their ideas and will come to constitute practices. Indeed, in surveying the 
context this early, we have collected important baseline data against which progress made 
in the coming years can be assessed. 
4.4 Ethical remarks  
As an ethical remark on our methodological approach, we realise that, as researchers, we 
deal with certain expectations on our positionality coming from our study’s research 
participants. We have provided the interviewees with information on our research by means 
of a consent form and prior (email) correspondence. This might have influenced the 
expectations and answers of the interviewees, what our (research) background is, and what 
the purposes of our research is. We approached the interviewees with research curiosity 
rather any intent to ‘evaluate’ them or judge the merits of the Whanganui case in the light 
of the rights of nature movement. 
                                                            
11 The interviewees explained the extended process of selection is due to the fact that Te Awa 
Tupua’s legislation is focused on long-term solutions and appointments, which need careful 
consideration and take longer because of extended (cultural) appointment practices and traditions of 
the iwi and hapu.   
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Moreover, we want to emphasise the limitations regarding the portrayal of the indigenous 
cosmology in this research, having a ‘Western gaze’. As researchers we tried to portray 
Māori worldviews as respectfully as possible. Still, we are fully aware of our primarily 
Western-oriented scientific background and not being from New Zealand, which somewhat 
biases the research process (Creswell 2015). We focus on the phenomenological 
descriptions of representing the river in the anticipated practice by multiple actors, rather 
than an anthropological explanation of the Māori worldview behind it (for a more elaborate, 
anthropological description of this case we refer to Salmond 2014). With our analysis, we 
aimed for a certain level of abstraction, following the research aim, and we acknowledge 
we have not always spelled out Māori knowledge and cosmology as fully as possible. We 
realise this research deals with (formerly) repressed, exploited subjects (an indigenous 
group, the river) so a transformative approach (Creswell 2015) would be more suitable to 
make space for change, using more democratic kinds of methods. Our analytical approach 
of assessing preliminary thoughts on representation exclude more participatory approaches, 
which for example would give agency to the Māori to share their opinions with other 
stakeholders within our research, treating them as research subjects rather than objects 
(Halse & Honey 2005, p. 2144). As a researcher we are privileged with the position of 
representing the realities of other people, and we try to remain critical while appropriating 
their descriptions and experiences (Mauthner & Doucet 1998). 
4.5 Contribution 
We follow an interpretative qualitative research design, looking for phenomenological 
interpretations the different actors have on representing the river as a legal person. Creswell 
(2015) favours this design over a quantitative one, as it gives space to elaborate on the 
(subjective) meaning-making processes within our data collection. More specifically to the 
topic, within their study of environmental representatives, Boström, Uggla & Hansson 
(2017) deem it important to qualitatively analyse the sociological dimensions of 
representation to “illuminate” what representatives think of their own roles and are “shaped 
by their organizational and professional contexts” (p. 2). This research takes on a similar 
approach, but adds the moral and communicative contexts as well. 
 
By the application of representation concepts grounded in human (political) theory to the 
context of nature representation, our study contributes to the field of environmental 
communication and political theory by highlighting important gaps and needs for 
theoretical revision in an emerging paradigm of nonhuman political representation. Indeed, 
the application of representation to a (partly) voiceless (a)biotic aggregate reveals broader 
problems and inadequacies of traditional representation relevant also to political theorists 
solely addressing environmental issues from a point of departure of human rights, interests, 
and politics. We will re-interpret the classical concepts named in the theoretical framework 
by applying them to the Whanganui case and contribute to a practical, less human-centred 
application of these theoretical concepts, while recognising that such representation 
continues to be entangled in human interests and agendas. With our study’s research 
approach, we want to place the TAT case into the broader context of the worldwide trend of 
giving rights to nature, which contributes to the external validity of our thesis as well 
(Bryman 2012).  
 
As a last point, the topic and described phenomenon in this thesis could also be 
interesting to anthropologists engaging in postcolonial theory, looking at how vulnerable 
‘Others’ (whether indigenous or non-human) are represented. This is evidenced by us 
participating in the panel presentation “Conflicting Conceptualisations of Environmental 
Vulnerabilities”. This panel was part of the conference Engaging Vulnerabilities in 
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Uppsala, organised by the Swedish Anthropological Association (SANT), and the Finnish 
Anthropological Society (FAS), which took place in April 2018. 
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5 Results  
In the next section we elaborate on our findings in four main themes based on the 
phenomenological descriptions (exemplified by quotes) of the representative practice of 
TAT, as brought up during the conducted interviews (see figure 2).  
In short, following our interpretative process, we found three main pillars: (1) the holistic 
character of the river community not only functions as an overarching holistic worldview 
but is also seen as serving the preferred moral relationship with the river, being practically 
manifested by a reciprocal relation with the river, whereby (2) the legal character of the 
case is seen as a vehicle creating standing to maintain the river’s health and wellbeing, 
however a danger is recognised of the general public misinterpreting the ‘legal person’ 
concept, and lastly (3) an emphasis is put on the need for collaboration of the 
representatives in order to unite the multiple voices of the river to get the ‘closest 
representation’ possible. As a backbone of the emerged themes, we argue and exemplify as 
well that the statements and claims recognised within the three themes are influenced by 
different knowledge systems, which is elaborated on first.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Illustration of the themes distilled from the interviews 
31 
5.1 Different knowledge systems: between defining and relating 
Knowledge is obviously a benchmark to decide what is good for the river (and decide on 
for example goals for the River Strategy) and to be able to weigh different interests and 
values when representing the river. The three knowledge systems described are (1) Māori 
knowledge or in general ‘way of knowing and understanding’ (mātauranga Māori) (2) 
Western knowledge (mātauranga Pākehā), and (3) common sense or anyone’s knowledge 
derived from observations. Furthermore, we do not aim to demarcate specific boundaries of 
the three knowledge systems and realise they can be fluid in certain interviewees’ 
descriptions, which fits the holistic character of this case, and arguably offers possibility to 
“dismantle” a strict knowledge divide (Agrawal 1995) in decision-making. 
5.1.1 Māori knowledge and cosmology (mātauranga Māori) 
The referred to Māori knowledge, among other things, includes concepts of their holistic 
understanding of the world, such as the genealogical connection (whakapapa) the iwi have 
to the river as part of their cosmology, in which the river is considered an ancestor 
(tupuna). To give an example of the importance of these concepts within TAT’s legislation, 
Interviewee 6 talks about the earlier defined concept kaitiakitanga or “indigenous 
guardianship”, as a sustainable relation or balance between people and their environment. 
 
 Apart from Māori interviewees elaborating on their cosmology and the holistic worldview 
(further explained in section 5.2), non-Māori representative actors respect this relation and 
the spiritual manifestation: “(...) I think the Māori story is such a strong one, about how 
their ancestors in the river talk to them, (…) that is where the spirits are.”, says 
interviewee 7. However, she does acknowledge her limits of understanding the full 
meaning of this connection and knowledge regarding consulting the river as an ancestor:  
 
“There are some traditions (...) that I don’t understand exactly what that means, but they 
know. Those of us who are not (...) probably never gonna be able to understand that, so they 
just don’t share it with anybody because, in order to sit at it and talk with it, you have to 
understand a way lot more” 
 - Interviewee 7 
 
This description arguably assumes a more deeply entrenched connection the iwi has with 
the river. It shows a challenge interviewee 7, along with other non-Māori representative 
actors, to be limited in accessing this connection and traditions, even though it is very 
respected and a core part of the legislation. 
5.1.2 Western knowledge (mātauranga pākehā) 
From another perspective, Western knowledge (Mātauranga pākehā) is mainly described in 
a scientific context, meaning to play a role in assessing the health and wellbeing of the river 
in its physical, environmental sense such as water quality, providing technical support for 
the human faces (Te Pou Tupua) and the strategy group (Te Kōpuka). 
 
Interviewee 2 admits previous management plans on the river were “very much science-
based” reliant on this knowledge: “We traditionally have a Western way of looking at 
rivers so it’s (...) a resource management relationship with the river”.  He exemplifies this 
with explaining what the impacts of agriculture are on water quality, nitrogen levels in the 
river, water allocation and so forth. He further states that the relation of the Regional 
Council to the river will “fundamentally” change. However, he sees it as an improvement, 
making it less confined and putting the river at the centre of things, rather than the river as a 
resource to be used for exploitation. 
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Nonetheless, techno-scientific knowledge also seeped through when talking about the 
strategy document; ‘Western science’ will still make up a significant part of decision-
making regarding the river. For example, interviewee 3 deemed it important to have 
incorporated measures for the strategy to be successful. Others claim it to be essential for 
the different representative bodies to have a good technical support in order to provide and 
understand various sources of data about the river. Still, the general tendency of the 
interviews defines this (arguably) exclusive expert-driven knowledge as rather supportive 
to the moral core of the legislation when asked how the river’s status is assessed. 
Recent contemporary techno-scientific improvements are also applauded for to improve 
understanding of knowing what the environmental impacts of certain activities on the river 
are, such as waste management around the river. 
 
On the contrary of this trust in Western scientific knowledge, interviewee 4 (of Western 
descent) shows a rather sceptical view on using science for determining the river’s status. 
He maintains it was not needed in the past before any Europeans arrived, arguing it was 
only needed to measure environmental impacts that were caused by them anyway. 
Overall, Western technoscientific knowledge will, according to the interviewees, play an 
important role in determining mainly the environmental impacts on TAT. However, to ward 
against the colonisation of Western knowledge, the legislation attends to (Māori induced) 
moral standards and representatives to arguably realise the “imbalance” science has brought 
upon the river. 
5.1.3 What does the river look like? ‘Common knowledge’ 
The third and last knowledge system discussed, although to a lesser extent, is ‘simply’ 
referred to as common knowledge, or just anyone’s knowledge. Referrals to this kind of 
knowledge are mostly used in the context of observing the environmental status of the 
river. 
Interviewee 1 elaborates on the role of this type of knowledge within the river’s 
management and its relatable character: “(...) there is also a layer of, what might be tagged 
as Mātauranga, but is actually just anyone’s, (...) just observational data, like what does 
the river look like”. It can arguably be characterised as an inclusive kind of knowledge, as 
anyone can observe what the river looks like, as long as you are living nearby and 
experience individually what is going on with the river. This is also referred to as seeing 
‘signs’ of the river, such as the clarity of the water and fish stocks. It may be understood as 
anyone’s empirical observations. Further elaborating on this notion, another interviewee 
claims how clean water should be a right to anyone, the common sense of what clean water 
is, is identified as playing a big part in iwi’s role within the framework: 
 
“That are kind of some of the measures that iwi would be looking at in the future, that we can 
go to this and at the river, take a glass of water and drink it safely and give it to our kids. 
Ultimately that is what I personally want to see at scale. (...) for some places in New 
Zealand, and I have (...)taken my kids (...) to swim, we thought was fine. They come out 
scratching next day, because of what was in the water.” 
 - Interviewee 3 
 
All in all, the interviewees acknowledge the importance of legitimising local, ‘common 
knowledge’ to determine the health and wellbeing for the river and the surrounding 
communities within decision-making.   
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5.1.4 ‘Would you drop poison on your ancestor?’ Clashes & opportunities  
Both challenges and opportunities were expressed by the interviewees in relation to 
juxtaposing the different knowledge systems. On the one hand, combining the different 
knowledge systems were potentially clashing in the future, but on the other they were 
thought of to provide bridges of different perspectives. A practical example of such a clash 
is given by interviewee 1, who describes the helicopter drop-off of poison in the area to 
eradicate exotic pests in and around the river’s catchment: 
 
“(...) you know from a technical perspective, scientific perspective you would say it doesn’t 
have any impact on the specific species or the flora and fauna of the river, but again 
philosophically and culturally it could be considered for many to be very offensive, just 
drop that on the river.”  
– Interviewee 1 
 
These competing claims show how dropping poison can be legitimised by scientific 
evidence (only harming the ‘aimed for target’) whereas speaking from a Māori 
cosmological perspective, now that the river is a recognised legal person the act is 
intrinsically unacceptable and disrespectful. 
When thinking in genealogical terms and seeing the river as an ancestor (tupuna), it is 
legitimate to think this way. But what if they both fit a different purpose? 
Another challenge is given within the context of combining different concepts of how the 
river is traditionally defined. When asked about this disparity in defining the river, some 
interviewees predict the legal person concept might clash with established Western 
concepts of the river when the implementation process starts of. Interviewee 3 states that 
there could “be a real conflict in the Western model of property rights and Te Awa Tupua”, 
and further explains that with the new legislation “any take of the water for irrigation, or 
for hydro-electricity, or anything else will need to be done under this new context and 
improve (...) the health and wellbeing. On paper you would say it probably doesn’t, so 
leave the water in there.” However, he claims that they always need to consider what is 
good for TAT, as a whole, as there is a “need to balance it out with the health and 
wellbeing of the communities as well.” 
 
Furthermore, a certain “pick and match” strategy is spoken of by interviewee 2 when 
utilising “certain indigenous knowledge” selectively in other legislations and “how they 
cope with values like it’s kind of code (...) you can write a set of cultural values down and 
draw them on a map and what we can take out them, but if you can’t, then you forget 
them.” Obviously, this tendency is problematic as it implies selective appropriation, but it 
is less likely to happen if Māori cosmology forms a solid baseline in the new legislation. 
 
At the other side, opportunities for these different kinds of knowledge systems are spoken 
of. When talking about ways of assessing the health and wellbeing of the river, one of the 
strategy group members sees her role as having the ability and experience to “bridge” the 
two knowledge systems. Referring to diverse scientific measurements both explicitly (such 
as sediment) and implicitly (such as E. Coli and nitrogen levels) she concludes that it is 
doable to combine both knowledge systems: 
 
“All those factors come from a Western science bases, but some of them transfer across to a 
Māori view of what does a healthy river look like and obviously those are indicators of (...) 
biological health as well, so what animals can live in it, so you know all those measures you 
can define in a Western science way and you can relate to it in a Māori science way.” -
  Interviewee 1 
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Regarding how to listen to the river, the following example explains the dualistic 
entanglement of different knowledge systems offered by interviewee 2: “(...) there’s two 
parts there”. According to him one “is listening to the river in terms of (...) things you get 
to see, whether there’s too much sediment in it or see the effects of water pollution or water 
extraction”. Secondly, he continues to argue that “a more fundamental part” lays in “Te 
Pou Tupua [who] have been appointed to speak on behalf of the river and that’s their only 
singular function in the world. So (...) in terms of listening to the river to understand you 
should be able to see and understand what is happening to it.” 
 
As deduced from the previous two statements by interviewee 1 and 2, a balance of 
defining the river and relating to its (legal) status is identified to support the representative 
process as in (1) defining the health and wellbeing of the river by “listening” to it, whether 
it is by certain measurements or empiric observations and (2) understand “what is 
happening to it” by putting these knowledge claims into the context of seeing the river as a 
singular enfranchised entity. What the holistic view of the river as an entity encompasses is 
elaborated on next. 
5.2 The river at the heart of everything: holism as ethos 
As the different knowledges have been set out as a background, we now describe what the 
interviewees deem important when talking about representing the river within its 
implementation. All interviewees emphasise the core of Te Awa Tupua, meaning the river 
as “the sum of all its parts”. This is in line with the legislation’s formal content basing its 
“essence” on the four intrinsic values (Tupua te Kawa) (see appendix 1). Except of 
functioning as an overarching worldview, the interviewees describe this holistic character 
“at the heart of everything’’, that all representatives have or should internalise and ought to 
be communicated to the public as well as forming the core of the river strategy. However, 
this ethos is not always seen as that easy to implement, as other views on the river might 
throw a spanner in the works when practically manifesting this moral relationship as 
reciprocal, sustainable action. 
5.2.1 Indivisibility as a practical challenge 
As argued before, the four intrinsic values of the legislation are mainly focused on the 
holistic view of the river as a whole, and the inalienable connection the iwi have with it. 
Interviewee 3 mentioned that the river’s health and wellbeing is “(...) intertwined with the 
health and wellbeing of the iwi as well. Because we are so tightly connected to it. So not 
just culturally and spiritually, but also economic well-being for a long time has been tied to 
the river.” It shows how the river is perceived as a natural-cultural construct comprised of 
both human and natural elements, being a source of physical and spiritual sustenance, 
seeing the river as an inherent part of their livelihoods. As exemplified in the following 
quote of interviewee 6 these values change the way decision-making regarding the river is 
made:  
 
“you have the notion that the river is indivisible [and] can no longer be approached in its 
parts and that the indigenous peoples have been defined as a part of this picture as 
inalienable and have a responsibility towards that river. And of course you have the 
community, who are all part of this definition of this framework.”  
- Interviewee 6 
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However, this relation based on the iwi’s dependence and livelihoods is often 
emphasised, others also refer to a more observational sense in why the holistic view is 
important. 
Interviewee 7 illustrates an example how the holistic worldview is embedded in 
observations of the river. “There are some impressive pictures of (...) the Whanganui river 
flowing down” she describes when talking about the siltation of the river. “[First the river] 
is green or blue and then there is a picture coming in of a side river that is brown (...)and 
then it joins [the main stem] and the whole river’s brown.” This ‘turning brown’ of the 
river shows that the holistic image of the river catchment is important in empirically and 
environmentally assessing it. Instead of referring to singular problems, it emphasises how it 
has an impact on the whole river community.  
 
There is a general positivity among the interviewees concerning working with the holistic 
picture of the river.  Moreover, interviewee 6 claims this to possibly result in a social 
“change of paradigm”. The same interviewee envisions it to give standing to both the 
Māori relationship with nature, but also respect to the so-called “laws of nature”. Similarly, 
interviewee 7 claims the “original state” should be retrieved as well, whereas at the same 
time mentions new economic opportunities, which would arguably depart from the original 
state. 
All things considered, the economic benefits communities around the river are believed 
to be inextricably linked with the social, cultural, and environmental aspects of the river’s 
catchment in which the claim is made that if one flourishes, the other will as well. Hereby 
an abolishment of a hierarchy in social, cultural, environmental, and economic purposes is 
implied. 
 
Still, even though the river is now legally recognised as a whole, “previous sorted 
boundaries” are in use but are expected to be “disintegrated”. These boundaries are 
criticised by interviewee 6 as a dividing concept as they: “are cut across rivers and 
people.” When talking about the Fish & Game Council, he states that “(...) at the top of the 
river the Auckland council is involved, and Auckland [the city] is a long way from here!”. 
The pre-distinguished regions, and the segmentation of the river is shown by interviewee 5, 
pointing to the boundaries of fishing and hunting regions on a map at the beginning of the 
interview. However, he does emphasise and supports the “(...) greater good of the river, the 
whole package being the environment, being the economic sustainability of the 
communities and the cultural aspects”. 
Another prevalent criticism often appears when mentioning a hydroelectric company. It is 
described how the power scheme that uses the Whanganui river not only caused 
environmental degradation over the years, but also spiritually affected the river’s power 
(mana) by diverting its natural flow and taking in water. This upset the iwi living around 
the river, and as a result the dynamics between them and the hydroelectric company is 
described as troublesome in the past, but now they “seem to have a reasonable 
relationship” according to the interviewee 7. It can be argued the ontological views both 
parties have been disparate (the river as an exploitable, compartmentalisable resource 
versus a holistic ancestor) but it is mentioned that the iwi have been “generous” by 
including the hydroelectric company in the strategy group, moreover showing interest in 
how this dynamic will play out.   
All in all, actors involved in the legislation refer to the river differently, as well as that it 
might clash with previous established structures (such as the mentioned boundaries). It 
raises questions ‘whose river’ is legitimate to be represented. Despite the general 
enthusiasm and support, some of the interviewees agree that there is not a lot of guidance in 
the legislation in what the preferred relation based on the four intrinsic values practically 
entail, and how it interferes with other ways of recognising the river as an object of 
ownership for example. The following sub theme illustrates how the holistic character of 
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the river can be practically manifested and arguably clarifies how the differences could be 
‘balanced’. 
5.2.2 Don’t talk about the river, talk to it: Manifesting holism with reciprocity 
As seen in Chapter 2, reciprocity is described as an important moral baseline recognising 
nature’s agency. The legislation’s emphasis on the river as a holistic entity is believed by 
the interviewees to provide and promote a more respectful relation providing a balanced 
health and wellbeing, countering the ontological view where “the river [is] being seen as 
an expendable resource that you basically use for your own benefit but don’t give back to.”. 
This practical relation is exemplified by the interviewee 6, in which he refers to how, as a 
little boy, he received the privilege to perform a prayer (karakia) at the river but was held 
back by his elders. The following passage explains how his euphoric feeling stalled: 
 
“I thought I was the centre of the universe, because I was asked to do the prayer as a young 
man and I went to the river and they took the wind out of my sails and they were quite 
correct, cause they came (...) and said to me “Son, where’s your contribution to the river?” 
(...): you thought about what you meant to take from the river and it wasn’t fundamentally 
and primarily about what you were giving back to the river.” - interviewee 6 
 
Having this memory in mind, he follows to mention how he wants, now TAT’s legal 
personality is established, to elevate this philosophy and urge people and industries to think 
what their impacts are when performing actions in or near the river, whether it is a private 
farmer, or a hydroelectric power company. Interviewee 6 presents the example of how an 
agricultural company requested a waiver from the iwi, insinuating questionable, 
environmentally degrading plans. He further criticises it was done without any thought on 
what the impacts would be to the river nor consulting the iwi before. He describes the 
“giving back” part as always having in mind what an action will mean to the river and try to 
consult the community before: “giving back to the river is all about that, talking to the 
community, (...) what can I do to create the best outcome for the environment, even it 
means my profits [are] gonna be less. (...) So that is one way to give back and is actually to 
talk to the river”. 
He continues this “talking to the river” has been a “salient maxim” for the iwi around the 
river for generations, being “instructional” on how to treat and respect it. However, 
arguably this could be applied to anyone involved in the river or being part of the legally 
established community. Herein, reciprocity can be recognised as a ‘best practice’ to endorse 
the holistic, legal framework as a balancing act between nature and humans, which are 
claimed to be part of the same community. Although, interviewee 6 mentions that this 
“whole ethos” is primarily indigenous, he claims it does not mean it cannot be shared with 
the rest of “the river community”. For example, interviewee 2 states that it should be part 
of the learning process to “talk with the river” and decide proper actions upon it. 
5.2.3 Intergenerational justice coupled with solidarity 
The process up to the new legislation is often described as “a long one”. The need for a 
reciprocal, holistic way of managing the river has an intergenerational dimension, as the 
descriptions provide justice to (1) past generations that have fought for the river for around 
150 years, but also (2) preserving a healthy river for present and future generations. For 
example, interviewee 3 states “(...) as a birth right, you want your kids to be able to (and 
my grandkids) to swim in the river. And ideally be able to drink that water, (...)”. However, 
when the interviewee 1 talks about how the “rights of nature philosophy” can be spread, 
she answers: “if we prioritise it in our decision-making and stop thinking of it as an asset 
for our youth and instead thinking of it as something that is fundamental, that we respect 
and love and have to take care of” the outcomes can be even greater. She recognises the 
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same stance of responsibility for future generations as the interviewee quoted before but 
adds the intrinsic value of healthy waterways (and arguably nature on its own) on top, 
which we should show solidarity with, to reach the aimed for change. 
5.3 Negotiating personhood: a legal vehicle & humanised metaphor 
In the following section, we elaborate on how the interviewees argue that the 
instrumental, legal aspect of this case brings both opportunities and challenges for 
improving the river’s status, as its official character obviously provides standing but also 
fosters (metaphorical) misconceptions regarding its legal status in the public sphere.  
 
The interviewees often talk about legal personhood as a tool or vehicle to incorporate 
Māori cosmology into a Western law framework, quite in line with how the phenomenon is 
defined in academia and gives standing to Māori relationships with water (Morris & Ruru 
2010; Iorns Magallanes 2015). Moral values and explicitly the four intrinsic values are not 
only the essence of the legislation, but also the relation that iwi have with the river or nature 
in general. As seen before, the concept of legal personhood should change the way people 
treat the river and give justice to both the Māori and the river. The vehicle itself is 
described by interviewee 8 as “nothing new under the sun: companies are artificial 
persons, trusts are, and corporate societies the same. So, it´s to try and use that kind of tool 
to treat the river in that particular way and then justice” arises. Interviewee 6 sees it as the 
closest manner to embody Māori values into Western law, changing people’s perspective of 
the river and achieving the aforementioned “paradigm shift”. This should bring about a 
collectiveway of thinking about the health and wellbeing and its long-term impacts12: 
 
“[the] legal person is the vehicle, so when we first thought about changing the dynamic and 
changing the paradigm through the river is viewed, we thought about those values (…) the 
very essence of our relation with nature, the laws of nature. So, we thought about those first 
and then thought [about] the vehicle required to carry it in a legal sense and of course the 
one of legal personality was the one that we used. (...) it is the closest approximation to, in 
that (…) Western legal sense.”  
- interviewee 6 
 
Clearly the Western construct of legal personality was picked to consolidate with the 
(Māori) holistic view instead of the other way around. Secondly, most interviewees refer to 
(environmental) wrong-doings which impacted the river and the (iwi) community in cases 
in which it did not have a voice. The legislation is seen by interviewee 3 as giving this 
voice or rather of recognising the pre-existing voice: “for iwi it was already there anyway, 
we always treat it as a person, so just giving it a voice in law (...), a Western sense of law”. 
Recognising the voice of the river gives it standing and through guardians it can potentially 
go to court. Nevertheless, there is a general tendency of interviewees rather avoiding this 
‘escalation’ of misunderstandings going to court. A possible explanation of such a legal 
challenge of this is given by interviewee 6, claiming that the legal system is not quite up to 
par yet with the holistic, moral framework TAT legislation consists of, as he argues it still 
uses the limited “natural resource jurisprudence” discourse. 
                                                            
12 In general, there is a sense of sustainability as the legislation is implemented by local actors which 
are appointed for long-term periods. It is framed against (previous) Crown ownership, which 
managed the river in cycles based on short-term elected governments. 
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5.3.1 “Will the river have a visa card?” Metaphorical strengths and weaknesses 
The linguistic strengths or connotations of the term legal person are dubiously referred to. 
Even though in the strict, legal sense of the word a legal person is not to be confused with a 
human person considering its rights, responsibilities, and duties. However, this confusion is 
often made and the humanised aspect of how a natural phenomenon was declared a person 
has appealed the public’s imagination. 
 
This notion causes some frustrations as seen in some interviewees’ responses. The 
following example of interviewee 8 shows how people exaggerate the implications of legal 
personhood and ‘overhumanise’ or misunderstand the terminology: “I have had a number 
of dimwits saying to me: “Will the river have a visa card?” What if the river overflows, can 
you sue it ’cause it has been a naughty boy?” you know this kind of stupid stuff.” Similarly, 
interviewee 7 doubts the validity of a statement of a tourism organisation regarding the 
river: “It said something about, yeah now that the river is a person… And I am like no it is 
not a person, it is a river!”  
 
On the other hand, the interviewees do take metaphorical, humanised aspects of the river 
to exemplify and legitimise the holistic approach to be suitable for the river’s management. 
When talking about the implications of seeing the river both as a resource to use and a legal 
person with rights, interviewee 2 says bringing those together will be a challenge, for 
example in the context of water abstraction. He illustrates the entire river as a body and 
claims “it’s kinda like putting a needle in” deciding upon “how much blood are we gonna 
take? (...) before the river’s sick and can’t give any more blood.” Similarly, another 
metaphor by interviewee 6 explains the indivisible nature of TAT. The processes of 
desegmentation of the river is compared to an incomplete human body as in “that you must 
treat it as a whole” as “it is impossible to deal with a dismembered, desecrated corpus. You 
know: what you and I can do without an arm or a leg?” 
Another human comparison given by the same interviewee, is that of the river as an 
orphaned child, exposed to multiple governmental agencies. It is explained this child is not 
managed separately by these institutions, but in collaborative manner, which criticises the 
compartmentalising way modern governments work.  
In this way, anthropomorphising the river works in both a mocking capacity as well as 
galvanising support for its conservation.  
5.4 Making ‘everyone’s’ river present: a collaborative process 
In this section we describe the collaborative, inclusive approach which is described as 
important in the legislation’s implementation. The deliberative process is identified to be 
vital, in which a multiplicity of voices can be brought to the fore. Most of the interviewees 
talked about the collaboration within the strategy group (Te Kōpuka). Furthermore, a 
certain personal connection is expected from all representatives to know what is best for the 
river and understand other’s opinions. 
5.4.1 Being of the river: a personal connection 
Most of the interviewees value a personal connection with the river within the 
representative framework of the TAT’s legislation. This connection is explained in multiple 
ways, varying from a deeply entrenched spiritual and genealogical connection, originating 
from Māori cosmology, on to a more direct relation to the river by living next to it and/or 
working along it. 
 
In general, there is a tendency for the representatives to claim that, to represent TAT well, 
the person needs to have a certain connection to the river. As the co-appointee of the 
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official human faces phrases being “of the river” offers a certain experience and 
connection, making the role of representative more legitimised by being directly involved. 
 
This connection is often emphasised in spiritual terms, such as the Māori whakapapa, 
based on genealogical ties between the people and the river as an ancestor. The term, 
however, is not strictly bound to the interviewees of Māori descent: interviewee 1 
emphasises her own personal connection when talking about river representatives’ 
qualities: “so I am not Māori, so I don’t have an explicit whakapapa to the river, but I have 
chosen to create my own one”. Similar to the previously explained “paradigm shift”, 
interviewee 6 agrees that it is not solely about whakapapa in its original sense, and rather 
sees the settlement and its implementation as a way of how people position themselves 
towards nature. “(...)there is already an emotional attachment to the river. (...) those values 
are not restricted to the indigenous people and it’s something all people could see and 
share within our own watershed, within our own river’s context”. 
 
However, interviewee 6 also claims that the personal relation with the river, of his 
generation and that of Māori children, has become less important, explaining that there 
seems to be a “loss of the physical connection as our primary relationship with the river”. 
Throughout past generations the spiritual connection to the river has been undervalued, by 
for example seeing the river more as “an expendable resource”. He also describes more 
recent development plans are established to get Māori children out of poverty which are 
mainly focused on the economical aspect and arguably still undermining this spiritual 
connection. The new legislation should bring back this connection, being embedded for 
example in educational systems rather than solely a technoscientific view of the river as 
right now “the curriculums actually cater for this particular view of the river. To align with 
the indigenous view, it necessarily must be supported by a change in the way we teach.” 
Afterwards interviewee 6 continues that enhancing this personal connection is considered 
vital for (future) representatives and decision-makers to take the river in its totality as a 
starting point, rather than people using it for certain purposes.  
However, the way to make sense of the complex holistic vision of TAT and combine the 
claims of knowing what is good for the river’s totality, is recognised within the practice of 
collaboration, which will be discussed now. 
5.4.2 Taking your hat off: collaboration starting from the river 
Collaboration is seen by the interviewees as a core element of the representation process 
and the implementation of the legislation. While not including the human faces of the river 
in court, the goal of the strategy group is to establish what the health and wellbeing of the 
river encompasses and how it is guaranteed by setting out a long-term strategy. 
Interviewee 2 claims that this process facilitates conversation, which holds the 
representatives of TAT accountable to the river as a whole: “When you need to have a 
conversation about how you might try to address those issues then there’s the power to 
speak on behalf of the river itself.” 
 
The deliberative nature of the strategy group (Te Kōpuka) is seen both as an essential 
opportunity and a challenge of bringing the ‘different voices of the river’ together, which is 
related to the different kinds of knowledge systems discussed before. Practically the 
representatives of the strategy group need to feed in all sorts of information and figure out 
how different laws and bylaws affecting the new legislation will work together. However, 
interviewee 2 raises the importance to “(...)actually leave your preconceptions and 
personal stuff behind and work out that you’re there for the good of the river.” showing 
that taking in a priori interests to negotiate is not the goal of the strategy group. Rather, the 
stakeholders must take their “hats off” when entering the room to respect the whole health 
and wellbeing of the river, rather than their sectors’ interest. 
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For being able to take the river community, as a “sum total” of all its different parts, as a 
starting point, it is also argued it is needed to represent the river in this multiplicity, rather 
than a human-based 50/50 (two party) co-governance model as seen in other mentioned 
settlements between Māori and the Crown. Still, the interviewees also mention it the 
challenge to bring together all the different voices together in decision-making. This is 
exemplified in sayings such as there is an easy chance to “information overload” because of 
the 17 members, and mocking jokes on how this will be a challenge for the moderator. 
Paradoxically, some people argued being in the strategy group for their sectors interests, 
whereas others were rather chosen for practicalities or a presence-based connection as 
described before. 
5.5 Summary of results 
To summarise, the interviewees’ descriptions of the phenomenon of ‘representing a legally 
personified river’ shows an enthusiasm and a preliminary trust in the new legislative set-up 
of the river’s status. However, this so-called vehicle calls to one’s imagination, both with a 
mocking capacity as well as galvanising support enhancing a holistic human-nature relation 
based on reciprocity. The representatives also emphasise the assessments that need to be 
done to know how TAT’s health and wellbeing can be maintained, whether this is done 
scientifically, spiritually or combining it into an epistemological ‘middle road’. However, 
challenges were recognised in reconciling different ontological worldviews of different 
representative actors in the strategy group, even though the interviewees found it to be 
rather generous to include actors with differing worldviews (e.g. the hydroelectric 
company). Representative criteria were identified within the emphasis of representatives 
being ‘of the river’; having a personal connection with it. 
 
In the next section, we continue to analyse what these statements mean in the context of 
the literature of (political) representation and abstract the relations uttered in these claims to 
place it into a more ecocentric praxis based on expanding what we define as 
communication. This notion facilitates moral affinity with the extended view of nature, 
including humans and non-humans.     
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6 Analysis 
In this analysis we elaborate on our observations and extend our findings with political 
representation theory, exploring both challenges and opportunities. We argue that different 
epistemic and ontological assessments, maintaining a communicative character, are backed 
up by a moral holistic relation. These form preconditions for the representative practice 
based on collaboration. These steps indicate that both assessing the river’s health and 
wellbeing as well as acknowledging a certain moral attitude of what TAT is comprised of, 
are both important to take along in the deliberative strategy-making process. To conclude, 
we offer a visualisation of a representative cycle including the processes described by the 
interviewees and abstracted by theoretical concepts. Moreover, we keep in mind the 
development of the global rights of nature movement throughout this discussion, and we 
offer some food for thought on the implications in the chapters hereafter.  
6.1 Between classical and relational representation 
As seen in the theoretical framework (Chapter 4), Saward (2006, 2009) defines 
representation as the dynamic, performative relation between the representative and the 
(what she/he claims to be) represented, rather than the mere definition of formal 
representative categories. Tanasescu (2016), within his discussion of this “relational view” 
being embedded within the rights of nature movement, elevates this view by analysing what 
the components and implications of these relations are. The author says both ethics and 
knowledge statements are part of the representative claim, instead of one part being more 
important than the other when analysing the structure of the representative relation (ibid.). 
Rather, the sutured connection of the representative is the structure of representation, both 
defining oneself as being part of a generalised us (the representatives of the river) which 
has a relation to the generalised ‘Other’ (the river). This river however is generalised by 
claiming a ‘certain semblance of unity’ within a claim, so the personal connection (for one 
a source of spiritual contemplation, for someone else a recreational resource) one may have 
with the river and the experiences with it forms a fusion of the representative with the 
represented (the river). The representatives unify themselves with the river, exposing the 
sutured relation in the interviews, which is most prevalent within the whakapapa concept. It 
tells us who the representatives are as humans and how they treat the river, as well as it tells 
us how they are relationary bound to the aggregated river. 
Thus, we recognise Tanasescu’s (2016) normative relational aspect of representation. 
However, given the study’s phenomenological approach, we illustrate that the 
representatives do emphasise the importance of assessing and internalising the river’s 
interests to decide upon decision-making, being closer to the descriptions of formal, or 
normative conditions of representation (Pitkin 1967, Williams 1998, Eckersley 1999, 
O’Neill 2001). It could be argued that in order to represent TAT in for example a 
deliberative strategy making process, the claims of the representatives both raise the 
importance of understanding the river as the holistic sum total of all its physical and 
42 
metaphysical elements (“I am the river, the river is me”), as well as how to assess its health 
and wellbeing (and the multiple ways of getting to that knowledge). 
6.2 A pre-political communicative relation 
As the assessments and definitions of what the river comprises are emphasised, we 
elaborate here on what the implications are of different knowledge systems identified. It 
can be argued that the ways the interviewees generate knowledge of the river in order to 
represent are epistemic claims. However, the ways the representatives define the river, as 
seen in the holistic theme, are more ontological. What is the dynamic here? We claim that 
the intersection of both epistemic and ontological claims frames the way of assessing the 
river, and are presumably forms of communication.  
It can be argued the identified holistic worldview and the belief it is possible to talk with 
the river, rather than about it, asserts a certain relation. It results in a very tight connection 
between the representative and represented. However, Tanasescu (2016) demonstrates that 
“talking with nature” does not always indicate a “matter of representation strictly speaking, 
but of translation, or rather allowing nature itself to speak through the human voice that is 
itself part of it” (p. 112). Whether or not “talking to the river” is an act of translation or 
representation, we would argue in this case it still establishes a relation that is important in 
shaping the legal person and managing decisions making processes upon it, as the 
representatives identify themselves with the river and ‘summon into being’ the relation they 
have with it within their claims. Thus, we state this process forms the pre-political practice 
which ‘prepares’ the representatives taking the river into deliberation. 
 
Salmond’s (2014) concerted approach to water management in Aotearoa/New Zealand 
describes the Whanganui case as an example, weaving together different ontologies of what 
nature is and how it is related to humans: the emphasis lies on how nature (or the river) is 
defined. O’Neill (2001) on the other hand raises the importance of epistemic claims in the 
representative process, which forms legitimate factors to represent a constituency. It is the 
knowledge and attitude based on solidarity which lead to the interests of the river that 
would feed into the representative claims: “Given the necessary absence of authorisation, 
accountability, and presence, claims to speak on behalf of nonhumans and future 
generations relies on epistemic claims, coupled with care” (O’Neill 2001, p. 483). 
Examples of these claims are the uttered statements to assess water quality empirically or 
scientifically and the spiritual descriptions of sitting at the river to listen. However, does 
this really imply an absence of all other categories? 
 
As seen in the theoretical framework (Chapter 3) the claim of the river being completely 
voiceless does not hold up here, considering the emphasis of the river being comprised of 
human and non-human parts as well as the “salient maxim” of the legislation to “go to it 
and talk to her” instead of “merely talk about the river”. Although, this ‘talking to the river’ 
is primarily embedded within Māori knowledge (mātauranga Māori), this conviction in the 
river’s voice can also be partly interpreted by Dryzek’s (1990) concept of ‘communicative 
ecological ethic’, as his emphasis on the local, non-generalised communication with the 
natural world fits here, given his emphasis on human perceptions of nature’s 
(communicative) feedback. This normative concept can be interpreted in the case as the 
emphasised ‘middle road’ or common knowledge. The latter form of knowledge is 
something that arguably all representatives can access, such as observations or visible water 
quality. However, Dryzek’s theory of communicative ecological ethic implies a human-
nature divide and cannot be simply seen as the solution, because the river is not only 
understood in its natural ecological way. Moreover, Dryzek criticises both Western 
rationalism and (ecocentric) spirituality to be totalitarian in their respective understandings 
of nature but, as earlier discussed (3.2.2), the importance of the holistic approach forms the 
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moral baseline for the legislation, ‘interweaving’ both indigenous cosmology and Western 
rationality. On another note, the author explicitly favours a local approach when 
operationalising the ‘communicative ethic’ to make good ecological decisions, bearing in 
mind the communicative epistemology of nature as a rational principle in order not to 
“suppress local ecological signals” (a.a., pp. 208-210). In the case of Whanganui, these 
signals are obliged to be ‘picked up’ again by representatives listening to it. The emphasis 
however, in Dryzek’s words, is not on the kinds of knowledge systems used. He rather 
proposes a “holistic experimentation”, in which “any particular interaction of human and 
natural systems in terms of a complex, nonreducible, and unique entity” (p. 209) would be 
favoured to lead to an improved perception of our environment not to be ignored. This 
‘improved perception’ can be linked with what Von Essen & Allen (2017) demarcate, in the 
context of internatural communication, as a pre-political relation with non-humans as a 
precursor of the political representation practice by proxy-representatives in the deliberative 
arena. This can be recognised in the case as well, as the (geographical and spiritual) 
emphasis on the relationship representatives have with the river acts as a baseline to 
represent them afterwards. 
 
Despite this local-communicative emphasis, a shift away from the importance of 
representation focused on the representatives and constituencies being linked in territorial 
or geographic terms, can be identified in political theory (Rehfeld 2005). This notion 
arguably sabotages this direct ‘communicative ethic’, as seen in for example ENGO’s 
making claims on behalf of nature worldwide or in a distant place. On the contrary, as seen 
in the interviewees’ emphasis on “being of the river”, geographical personal relations are 
thought of as a legitimate precondition to represent the river’s health and wellbeing. In 
Williams’ (1998) explanation of voice, deliberative processes should rely on the presence 
of representatives that have access to perspectives of those being marginalised. If access 
here counts as being of the river, living with the river and knowing about its perspectives 
and interests, does that not count as authorisation as well? If we accept that this is indeed a 
form of authorisation, it will take place in the pre-political practice of assessing TAT by 
being in its proximity, or to a greater degree being part of it identity-wise. This 
authorisation would then constantly be held up by reciprocity, whenever decisions are 
made, representatives would presumably pick up nature’s signals again to assess and reflect 
upon it individually before taking it into deliberation. 
The interviewees state that the process of formulating the health and wellbeing is open to 
interpretation as far as the strategy document is being developed. This results in the 
representatives having different preliminary meanings of what it encompasses, leaving the 
pragmatic content of the intrinsic rights of the TAT open to discussion. But even if the 
content of these rights is rather open for discussion, does this mean there is no moral 
obligation whatsoever? 
6.3 Restoring relations of moral debt 
One central question in society is whether moral duties precede legal rights and laws, or if 
law is that which generates moral duty. This is central to the river’s representation 
inasmuch as attribution of legal personhood. The latter is either done on the rationale that it 
induces a moral obligation toward its protection that has heretofore been missing, or that 
legal personhood is a mere formality assigned to an entity that we already have moral 
duties toward. In short, which is the chicken, and which is the egg: laws or moral duties? 
 
For this paradox we return to Tanasescu (2016), as he states that an ethical relation 
recognised within rights of nature representation processes is based on a sense of moral 
debt (p. 62). It can further be argued that therefore we make the aforementioned epistemic 
claims based on care (O’Neill 2001) and act out of solidarity within justice claims (Von 
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Essen & Allen 2017) towards nature and non-humans, to address this relation to restore the 
“ecological balance” narrative. However, these claims are rather a wish how nature should 
be, making “the moral dimension of our relation to nature central” (Tanasescu 2016, p. 
119) rather than showing what it is. The representative moral-claims are often framed as 
solutions to give (universal) justice to what Western society has done to nature and 
indigenous communities, which are now being translated into legal claims. The 
aforementioned subtheme of intergenerational solidarity (5.2.3) can arguably be analysed 
using the concepts of moral debt or guilt. Within this sub theme, three layers of guilt can be 
identified within the interviewees’ utterances: (1) a guilt for the river’s ‘imbalance’ 
(pollution, water intake, pests threatening native wildlife and so forth), and disrespecting its 
power (mana), (2) a moral debt towards suppressing Māori and Māori worldviews and a 
duty to give justice to the people who have fought for the legislation and (3) a guilt for 
future generations not being able to enjoy a ‘healthy’ river. 
 
Tanasescu claims this fatalistic moral debt narrative is at the core of non-human rights 
claims (2016, p. 62), although defines it as problematic as it paralyses humanity’s agency to 
take responsibility (p. 157). However, the layers of guilt are not perhaps debilitating in the 
Whanganui case, as they are mitigated with the recognition of the communicative ethic as 
described before: the river is now legally speaking and not considered voiceless anymore. 
The guilt is still there, but rather functions as a catalyst for change instead of causing 
immobilisation. This empowerment can be illustrated by interpreting this relation of moral 
debt with the help of Williams’ (1998) concept of memory within the representative claim: 
sharing a historical burden of oppression and discrimination. One could expect that the 
marginalised status of both the Māori and the river, including their spiritual 
interconnectedness, would give Māori more legitimacy in representing TAT sharing this 
burden. Nonetheless, the author continues that act of the representational claim should be 
based on equality and a shared responsibility to mitigate this moral debt: 
“The relationship among social groups is not one of moral inferiority or superiority; it is not 
disclosed by comparisons of relative guilt for a history of disadvantage, nor is it measured 
by the relative strength of group members’ work ethic. Rather, implicit in a group-based 
view of political equality and fair representation is the premise that just social cooperation 
must be ever vigilant” (a.a., p. 102). 
This argument can be recognised within the fact that the ‘tables have not completely 
turned’ as a colonial compensation: the inclusive approach of TAT’s legislative 
implementation and the interviewees’ emphasis on it being a genuine gesture from the iwi 
resulted in (even) including actors that in the past have insulted or not recognised their 
ontological views, for example the hydroelectric power company. Again, this further 
illustrates the implication of moral debt is not that paralysing but engendering in this case. 
Even though Tanasescu (2016) talks about formal texts, he claims: 
“the fact that nature is a person in law does not by itself imply moral personality, or moral 
treatment. When the advocates of nature speak as if moral and legal personality are natural 
allies, they are not making a statement of fact which could easily be disproved, but rather 
weaving a representative story that exploits the relational nature of representation and the 
moral debt inscribed in the concept of rights” (a.a., p. 138). 
This process could be identified in for example the metaphorical comparisons of the river 
to a human body used to exemplify the intended relation based on intrinsic values of TAT. 
The naturalising aspects of seeing the river as a holistic human body, following this theory, 
automatically assumes a forgotten, ancestral link with nature as a subject, which due to 
modernity became an object (ibid.). In the Whanganui case the economic rationale 
objectified the river as a productive resource in the past, serving the common good (Sunde 
2008). Statements within rights of nature claim this relationship to be abolished but it does 
not mean nature solely becomes a subject, as humans inevitably “use” the landscape 
(Tanasescu 2006, p.139). This dilemma is emphasised within the interviewees’ claims 
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when talking about the river as a resource or subject, using moral and resource-oriented 
descriptions interchangeably. 
6.4 Limits of giving rights 
So far, all these descriptions could hold up in representing nature in general, however what 
is the role of rights here morally speaking? The interviewees generally state that the 
people’s connection with the river (in some sort) has always been there, but are still 
questioning how, now the legislation has passed, this will be improved.  
Similar to Tanasescu’s (2016) claims, rights of nature as purely a legal construct is 
limited in affecting the desired societal change in how we relate and/ or view nature within 
TAT case. What is legally obliged does not always directly translate into moral norms. The 
author also poses the example of women having the same legal rights as men, but in reality, 
do not have the same moral rights as in certain cases they are still marginalised (a.a. pp. 165 
-166). However, the interviewees generally describe the legal personhood of the river as a 
tool or vehicle to bring about a paradigm shift in how we relate to nature, not seeing it as 
solely a resource but as something that should be respected, loved and/or preserved for next 
generations. These claims not only describe Tanasescu’s (and Saward’s) focus of 
representation as the relation a representative has with what is represented (both internally 
as inter-subjectively), it as well shows the necessary moral continuation of the legal 
proclamation in law, which is not enough to establish this paradigm shift, or humanity’s 
“improved relationship” with nature. The author also criticises that rights pre-establish or 
cement these moral relationships, by obliging people to think about them in a certain way. 
Although the collaborative approach of strategy-making includes actors that do not ‘fit’ the 
moral objective (e.g. the hydroelectric company), you could argue that this legal 
bindingness has resulted in some people thinking rather cynically about the legislation, 
seeing it as giving more power to Māori13, as well as ascribing ‘illogical and irrelevant’ 
human characteristics to it (think of the credit card example in 5.3.1). However, the author 
states to achieve moral inclusion “we tell stories, we build narratives, we symbolically 
chastise and praise” (Tanasescu 2016, p. 166); something the iwi and hapū have done for 
years regarding the river, upholding, and maintaining a (representative) connection some 
other people might have lost. This connection is to be spread by for example the mentioned 
educational programs TAT’s legislation and funds can establish. It is the question however 
how opponents of the legislation, calling it “an extra layer of bureaucracy” or “a strategy 
for Māori getting more of a say over the water”, will be convinced. They might see the 
construct as threatening, seeing the moral obligation as negative, imposing a worldview 
they do not identify with. In this sense, the legislation may hinder rather than help nature 
conservation advocacy. To be sure, this remains a largely an empirical question to be 
determined in the future. 
 
Overall, it seems to be a matter of communication and awareness to spread the moral 
relation (with nature), and time will tell whether this enthusiasm embedded within a 
paradigm change will succeed or not, for which the legal framework set a first step to give 
the relationship standing. 
  
TAT’s legislative act does enable the river to potentially sue anyone through its human 
faces (for example when the river as a whole is affected against its interest).  However, the 
described emphasis of the act is rather on facilitating a different relation with the river by 
including multiple voices in the strategy group. Together they form a strategy to enhance 
and maintain the health and wellbeing of TAT, mediated by TPT to give it standing both in 
court, decision-making processes and other (informal) settings. It shows how the 
                                                            
13 This informal statement was given during our fieldwork by someone not related to and not quite 
familiar with the legislation, as opposed to the representatives being predominantly positive about it. 
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representative practice also here exceeds formal arrangements (Saward 2009). The river 
community of TAT is seen as ‘pluralistic being’ made up of different human and non-
human parts, however the “legal personhood” construct (as it is an individual) is needed to 
fit the liberal, individualist system New Zealand law structure still maintains, to fit in and 
give some sort of standing. 
6.5 Sharing internalised interests 
The previously identified concept of presence becomes difficult when speaking of nature 
representation as representing those who cannot speak for themselves (Eckersley 1999, 
O’Neill 2001). Criticising Habermas’s ideal communicative community where all members 
are present and able to represent themselves, Eckersley (1999) argues that not all of those 
who are affected (e.g. non-humans) by decision-making processes are able to be present nor 
represent themselves in dialogue. Instead, it requires “role playing” (a.a., p. 26), where the 
representatives internalise or at least consider the interest of those who are not or cannot be 
present (Goodin 1996), as seen in the description of the pre-political stage.  
Goodin (1996) argues that instead of having every person or being representing their own 
interests, it is more empirically realistic, as well as morally and politically preferable to 
internalise the interests of others (including humans and non-humans): “Incorporating the 
interests of others within our own might not be such a bad thing, at least in so far as the 
alternative is that those interests would otherwise simply be ignored (ibid. p. 844)”. This 
internalisation of interests could be a precondition for reciprocity. However, explaining 
Young’s (1998) criticism on symmetrical reciprocity, La Caze (2008) states that it entails 
“merely a projection of the self’s perspective onto that of the other” (p. 118), as this is only 
a projection of your own perspective onto that of the someone else, which could be harmful 
when these projections are embedded in oppression-based ideologies and stereotypes. 
Think of the river in its former colonial set-up in which it was fully under Crown 
ownership, without Māori having a say over it whatsoever or “the Whiteys on the hill” (the 
urban conservative upper class) defining the Whanganui river valley as an objectified Other 
or “wild terrain”. Now representation, while well-meaning, might recolonise subjects by 
freezing them as objects in knowledge production and assigning them new representations 
(Mohanty 2003). 
Instead Young (1998 see La Caze 2008) introduces the concept of asymmetrical 
reciprocity as a relation based on the phenomenological description of dialogue and the act 
of giving, where there is more of an attempt to understand the other across differences and 
where perspective taking is based on asking questions. In the case of TAT this reciprocal 
relation is merely based on giving back after taking from the river, enhancing the 
community again. 
It can be argued that the personal connection as mentioned before brings the 
representatives epistemologically closer in being able to internalise the river’s interests and 
make them present again (Pitkin 1967) in the deliberative arena. By thinking about the 
health and wellbeing strategy for example, also their own interests are deemed relevant as 
they are (legally and morally) considered to be bound to the river. Still, Williams (1998) 
argues for a political equality, in which marginalised groups must represent themselves 
because otherwise their interests cannot be genuinely represented. This notion offers a 
dialectic dimension within this case, in which the river is embedded in both the individual 
representing and other parts of this identity not being able to be present at the moment (the 
non-human parts and future generations of Te Awa Tupua for example). 
 
However, this politics of presence relates to another difficulty, as there are numberless 
differences in identity and interests within the distinctive (marginalised) group (Eckersley 
1999, O’Neill 2001). This multiplicity of interests leads to the claim that “no-one can speak 
of a 'unified subject position’ (Eckersley 1999, p. 30)”. TAT is seen in law as one unified 
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legal person but is comprised of multiple components and therefore needed to facilitate an 
assemblage of voices. By the means of collaboration, distorted communication may be 
partly eschewed by the presence of the different actors, representing the interests of the 
affected community, engaging in dialogue, and checking each other’s claims in a 
transparent process. This however, does not exclude “strategic bargaining” (Eckersley 
1999, p. 33) from taking place among these different actors, and they may not always be 
able to reach to consensus on the river’s health and wellbeing. Nonetheless, consensus or 
compromises that are reached are legitimate if the interests of the marginalised are heard 
and represented by plural voices (ibid.).  However, within the strategy group the different 
actors pose the difficulty for bringing all interests together, which might cause in not 
reaching consensus. Still, by the collaborative approach, the actors want to mitigate the 
chances of issues escalating to court. 
Furthermore, Tanasescu (2016, pp. 120-124) argues if the task of representing is to be 
legitimate, it must be inclusive and based on negotiation (rather than just embedding pre-
defined relations in law). He states that the representation process of TAT is given a 
deliberative meaning as it is comprised of two equal guardians (later redefined as human 
faces) in a constant negotiation and deliberation with all affected and interested parties. 
This inclusiveness of the framework is identified by the interviewees in the human faces 
(TPT) for example listening and gathering information of all communities that fall under 
TAT’s legal personality, and the support and interconnectedness of all different 
representative bodies. 
 
As previously mentioned, everyone has different epistemological and ontological 
experiences and assessments of the river. The representatives within the strategy group (Te 
Kōpuka), are “present” not only as themselves but also by internalising the interests of their 
sector and the holistic worldview. With TAT comprising humans and non-humans, the 
internalisation of interests brings about another problem that Donoso (2017) calls the “over-
demandingness objection”. He states that it is unreasonable to demand from representatives 
to act under every condition in favour of the interest of non-human beings (which can be 
against the needs and interests of humans), since they are themselves human and thus they 
are naturally and legitimately biased to serve their own interests as well. However, this 
notion clashes with the holistic view of TAT, in which the people and the river are 
interconnected. Within the deliberative processes of TAT’s representation, people will have 
to justify themselves to others (Goodin 1996): “The more others there are who have to be 
given an explanation, the more likely it is that there will be someone among them who 
internalizes the interests of nature” (p. 845). This could be achieved by aiming for an 
enlarged discursive diversity (Carbaugh 2007), including different kinds of knowledge and 
experiences, which could help us rethinking the modern human-nature divide as 
exemplified in this case. We could conclude that TAT representatives are well on their way, 
although the challenge is still how to reconcile all the different voices making up the river 
in its totality. 
6.6 The representative cycle 
A representative practice can be distilled from the preliminary descriptions of the 
interviewees as seen in the thematic analysis of the data in the results (chapter 5) being 
abstracted by the applied political representation theory. It bridges the communicative, pre-
political relation with the political process of representing the river. 
 
The cycle (figure 3) consists of the (1) an a priori communicative assessment of the river 
as a pre-political process based on the described personal connection with the river by 
living with it. We draw this upon the emphasis of the interviewees to “listen” when being in 
presence of it, rather than just observing it for strategic reasons. This ‘communicative 
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ethic’, as theorised by Dryzek (1990), forms a baseline to internalise interests of the river 
community and form claims which establish a certain relation (Tanasescu 2016). These 
claims are then summoned into (2) the political representation practice of the river. This 
process is embedded in for example the strategy group collaboratively deciding on the 
health and wellbeing of the river and representing the river in court or in the public sphere 
by TPT. The aforementioned activities are believed to lead to standing of the river in court 
and decision-making processes, by which actions based on reciprocity (hau) can be 
interpreted as the ‘answer’ to the listening process when taking from the river by living 
with it. Hereby, taking the river’s health and wellbeing at the centre of this process, an 
accountability to the river’s health and wellbeing is maintained. 
This representative cycle is backed by the holistic and arguably ecocentric moral relation 
or ethos (as seen in section 5.2), which is now embedded in law.  
 
 
Figure 3. Tentative cycle of representation 
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7 Concluding remarks 
This thesis has given insight into the complexity of politically representing and 
enfranchising a natural phenomenon, focusing on the different ethical, political, and 
communicative implications that form the representative practice. The basis of this 
representation process is formed by people’s situated interpretation of their natural 
environment, and the dynamics of the environmental, cultural, and economic dimensions 
within the holistic framework of the Whanganui River community (Te Awa Tupua). 
Although the view that nature is voiceless is both pervasive in society and the reviewed 
literature, we argue that considering its holistic and ecocentric character, Te Awa Tupua 
(comprised of both human and non-human parts) cannot be defined as such. An attitude 
based on listening is seen as vital to reach a holistic ethos including reciprocity. When we 
practically allow this communicative ethic as a norm, it can serve as (1) a pre-political 
practice to epistemologically assess the interests of a natural phenomenon in whichever 
way (spiritually or scientifically), to (2) determine and maintain the health and wellbeing of 
it within a deliberative process. However, these assessments are by no means neutrally 
‘mediating’ the Whanganui River, when arguing that representation is based on a preferred 
relation between the human representative and the river as constituency. Genealogical 
connections and other personal relations with the river based on geographic presence form a 
backbone in the practice of claim-making, summoning the preferred relation to the river 
into being during the representative processes of deliberative strategy-making and 
enfranchisement by legal standing. However, a challenge emerges in how to reconcile the 
different knowledge systems when representing TAT as one single entity. Even though the 
holistic, pluralist nature of the river is recognised, the question remains how the 
representatives practically ‘interweave’ knowledge systems when decisions on sustainable 
reciprocal actions need to be made. 
 
Rights of nature can both serve as a vehicle and a blockade in opening this discursive 
plurality determining nature’s interests or the preferred moral relation to it in which 
different epistemologies exist side by side. On the one hand, opening possibilities because 
it legitimises the ecocentric aspiration to include more non-human voices into the political 
and legal sphere. On the other hand, it can also have a tendency to frame moral relations a 
certain way which might limit deliberation regarding opposing voices and embed pre-
supposed interests and representative-constituency relations by law.  
Cases such as TAT show that the world is ready to expand the boundaries of what is 
represented today and the need to expand our moral rights to others, whether we define 
them as “voiceless”, “marginalised non-humans”, “nature” or “spiritual ancestors”. It 
requires a certain flexibility, which in TAT’s case has been creatively dealt with by 
declaring an aggregated natural-cultural phenomenon the status of a legal person, which 
before was essentially reserved for human-formed constructs such as companies, 
corporations, and trusts. The experimental character of the case provides space to 
manoeuvre as not all goals to improve the river’s health and wellbeing are ‘set in stone’. 
However, there seems to be a paradox regarding the flexibility of representing nature as 
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well, and the configurations with existing laws still need to be figured out fitting a natural-
cultural construct into a Western legal system which is primarily based on a human-nature 
divide.  
 
Moreover, the declaration of the river’s legal personhood granted standing to the river’s 
interests or, as alternatively argued, rather the moral relation and the accompanying self-
definition we want to carry out; feeling united and in solidarity with the environment 
around us.  
        However, a constituency is represented in which everyone understands the way the 
river’s ‘feedback’ (or communicative signals) differently. Concepts to maintain the 
integrity of the representative process might need to be tightened as opposed to the 
flexibility needed to regard and embed non-humans in the legal and political processes. The 
geographically demarcated nature of TAT and the perceived tendency to select 
representatives based on their (physical) presence to both better understand its needs and 
have a personal connection with the river do help to set out what is considered legitimate, 
forming certain representative norms. This geographic, situated character of TAT is hard to 
transfer to the worldwide movement of rights of nature, as erasure or selective cultural 
appropriation of ‘indigenous knowledge’ would seem inevitable. However, the holistic 
point-of-departure can be applied in general terms, by starting decision-making from a 
natural phenomenon with standing which needs to be represented, rather than solely 
matching human interests regarding it.  
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8 Implications and recommendations for 
future research 
The implementation process of TAT’s legislation was still in preparatory stage at the 
moment of conducting this research. It would be fruitful to see how the preliminary 
thoughts and considerations of the representatives will be turned into actual decision-
making, and how collaboratively the representatives consult, discuss, and represent the 
river’s interests and make claims to each other, and how (the relation to) the river is made 
present in debate. Moreover, we recognise that certain power relations will be evident 
within these deliberations, based on the support of certain (dominant) discourses (whether it 
will be the now legitimised holistic worldview or traditional anthropocentric ones) or 
certain identities based on indigenous/Western knowledge dynamics or minority 
oppression. We recommend these studies to take a more observational-participatory 
approach to identify possible conflicts arising in the deliberative arena or in the courtroom. 
 
Furthermore, as other cases of recognising nature’s rights are emerging in countries such 
as Australia14, Colombia15 and the US16, it is important to see which representative 
components are recognised in any context and could be inspired by the Whanganui case. 
We would like to invite more researchers to empirically analyse other cases in the field to 
see where the strengths and challenges lay of this fast-developing movement of recognising 
and giving standing to ‘nature’s voice’ in practice.  
We could argue that other cases of rights of nature should take the geographically 
demarcated approach, so it is easier to determine who can represent nature when taking the 
localised communicative ethic as a starting point. However, it also raises difficulties in 
repeating the legal personality concept on (even more) exploited natural phenomena: what 
would be the criteria of giving a natural entity legal personality to make its implementation 
viable? Certainly, the acknowledgement of the Māori worldview helped the Whanganui 
case gain momentum, but how would this work when indigenous knowledge is not 
considered legitimate within a certain legal framework? What are the differences of cases in 
which NGOs and other concerned citizens lead a rights of nature case compared to a case 
presented in this thesis: would a communicative ethic and preferred moral relations face 
similar opportunities and challenges or would it be more problematic to implement? 
                                                            
14 The Guardian, It's only natural: the push to give rivers, mountains and forests legal rights: 
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/apr/01/its-only-natural-the-push-to-give-rivers-
mountains-and-forests-legal-rights 
15 World Economic Forum, The Colombian Amazon now has the same legal rights as you: 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/04/colombias-top-court-orders-government-to-protect-
amazon-forest-in-landmark-case 
16 The New York Times, Corporations Have Rights. Why Shouldn’t Rivers? 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/us/does-the-colorado-river-have-rights-a-lawsuit-seeks-to-
declare-it-a-person.html 
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At last, the field of environmental communication has opportunities to expand its focus 
by analysing empirically how multiple voices are facilitated in the globally growing 
movement of rights of nature, in which discursive plurality including (formerly 
marginalised) voices of non-human nature is facilitated. By recognising an enlarged 
discursive diversity including nature’s agency embedded within different kinds of 
knowledge and experiences, as has been exemplified by this case, the world could rethink 
the modern human-nature divide. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 2. Tupua te Kawa, four intrinsic values, taken and (partly) altered from the Te Awa Tupua 
(Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 subpart 2, section 13. Source: 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2017/0007/latest/whole.html  
 
Ko Te Kawa Tuatahi 
Ko te Awa te mātāpuna o te ora: the River 
is the source of spiritual and physical 
sustenance 
Te Awa Tupua is a spiritual and physical 
entity that supports and sustains both the 
life and natural resources within the 
Whanganui River and the health and well-
being of the iwi, hapū, and other 
communities of the River. 
Ko Te Kawa Tuarua 
 
E rere kau mai i te Awa nui mai i te Kahui 
Maunga ki Tangaroa: the great River 
flows from the mountains to the sea 
Te Awa Tupua is an indivisible and living 
whole from the mountains to the sea, 
incorporating the Whanganui River and all 
of its physical and metaphysical elements. 
Ko Te Kawa Tuatoru 
 
Ko au te Awa, ko te Awa ko au: I am the 
River and the River is me 
The iwi and hapū of the Whanganui River 
have an inalienable connection with, and 
responsibility to, Te Awa Tupua and its 
health and well-being. 
Ko Te Kawa Tuawhā 
 
Ngā manga iti, ngā manga nui e honohono 
kau ana, ka tupu hei Awa Tupua: the small 
and large streams that flow into one 
another form one River 
Te Awa Tupua is a singular entity 
comprised of many elements and 
communities, working collaboratively for 
the common purpose of the health and 
well-being of Te Awa Tupua. 
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Appendix 2 
The offical descriptions are taken directly or summarised from Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui 
River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, source : 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2017/0007/latest/whole.html 
 
Table 3. Roles within Te Awa Tupua's legal/representative framework 
 Official descriptions Remarks of interviewees’ on 
these roles 
Two ‘human 
faces’ of the river/ 
Te Pou Tupua 
Section 18 & 19: 
The purpose of Te Pou Tupua is to 
be the human face of Te Awa Tupua 
and (legally) act in the name of Te 
Awa Tupua. 
 
Some key functions of Te Pou Tupua 
are:  
 
•  to act and speak for and 
on behalf of Te Awa 
Tupua; 
• uphold Te Awa Tupua’s 
status and Tupua te kawa 
(the 4 intrinsic values) 
• promote and protect the 
health and well-being of 
Te Awa Tupua 
• to administer Te Korotete 
(the fund)  
 
• jointly appointed 
by iwi and the 
Crown, instead 
of separately 
• A general trust in 
them being 
experienced as 
they are ‘of the 
river 
 
Advisory group/ 
Te Karewao 
Section 27 & 28: 
• Provide advice and 
support to Te Pou Tupua 
in the performance of its 
functions 
• Act in the interests of Te 
Awa Tupua and 
consistently with Tupua 
te Kawa. 
• lobby between 
different parties 
• network to ‘test 
the waters’ of 
decisions 
• diplomatic 
influencers 
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Strategy group/ 
Te Kōpuka 
Section 29 - 34: 
Te Kōpuka is established to be a 
strategy group for Te Awa Tupua. 
 
• Te Kōpuka comprises 17 
representatives of persons 
and organisations with 
interests in the 
Whanganui River, 
including iwi, relevant 
local authorities, 
departments of State, 
commercial and 
recreational users, and 
environmental groups. 
• Members act 
collaboratively to 
advance the health and 
well-being of Te Awa 
Tupua. 
 
The primary function of Te Kōpuka 
is to develop and approve Te Heke 
Ngahuru (strategy document) as well 
as:  
• To monitor the 
implementations and 
review the strategy 
document 
• To provide a  forum for 
discussion of  issues 
relating  to the health and 
well-being of Te Awa 
Tupua 
 
• being a 
“superman” or 
“superwoman” 
based on 
different skills 
needed (e.g. 
communication, 
relationship 
management) 
• connection 
between strategy 
group and sector 
• have cultural 
sensitivity; 
aware of past 
grievances 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4: Our interpretation of the role dynamics within Te Awa Tupua's framework 
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Appendix 4 
Interview guide: 
TAT = Te Awa Tupua (river as a living whole, consisting of all physical and metaphysical 
elements) 
TPT = Te Pou Tupua (‘human faces’ of TAT) 
RON = Rights of Nature 
 
Prior the interview: 
 
• introduce research project, general theme (about Te Awa Tupua and the 
interviewee’s role in representing it + their perspective) 
• set outline of interview (general introduction,  
• consent form 
• ask if names can be used or should stay anonymous 
• ask if interview can be recorded 
• if you use Māori terminology, could you please elaborate  
 
1. Introduction 
Goal: The personal connection to the river, how the situation was before and how the new 
legislation influenced this situation.  
 
Where do you live/come from? 
Can you describe yourself shortly? 
• Can you give a short description current function (both within TAT and other 
activities)? 
• What is your personal connection to the river? 
• Has this relation been affected/changed since the bill passed / TAT was 
recognised a legal person? 
• Can you describe the situation of the Whanganui River before it got recognised 
as a legal person/TAT? 
• How much do you think this situation changes now it has been recognised a 
legal person? 
• How do you think the TAT’s legislation works together with the Resource 
Management Act & other legislation considering nature a resource based on land 
ownership? 
 
2. Representation practice and roles 
Goal: How is the practice of representation understood and on which kinds of (moral) 
ground and claims is it based? (both formally and morally) 
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2.1 Formal obligations 
• Can you describe your role within Te Awa Tupua framework and could you give 
any concrete examples what your role will be in the representation process? 
• Did you apply for this role to represent the river, or did you get appointed? Why 
did you apply? / why do you think you got appointed? 
• How do you think TAT Bill gives leverage to represent the river’s interest? In 
which ways is it different than before? 
• Which qualities do you think a representative should have to represent TAT? (if 
not direct representative) 
• Could you describe the personal relations of the people living around? 
• Who do you think is credible to represent the river? 
• What do you see as the main goal of TAT’s representation? 
• How do you think the representatives will be evaluated on their work of 
representing TAT, will there be any sense of feedback process? 
• Can you describe the different ways of assessing the health and wellbeing of 
TAT, which ways is it mediated? How will it be acted upon?  
• According to you what should be in the strategy document for the river? 
(produced by Te Kōpuka) 
 
2.2 Moral stances  
• Do you feel you’d represent TAT/the river as a “physical and metaphysical 
whole”, as described in the act, or you think you will emphasise on certain parts 
of it based on your background or expertise perhaps? 
• How would you define the ‘health and wellbeing’ of the TAT? What do you 
consider to be ‘good’ for the river and all of its elements? 
• Do you think your idea of health and wellbeing of the river goes together with 
your interest in the river?  
• Do you have any other (personal) interests, (moral) values and/ or experiences 
you want to include in the representation of TAT’s health and wellbeing?  
• How do you think representing natural phenomena compares to representing 
marginalised cases of humans (disabled, children, future generations)? In what 
way is it different? 
• Do you think the river as a resource and a legal person go together?  
 
2.3 About Te Pou Tupua (human faces) 
• How would you describe TPT’s role representing TAT? 
• How do you think TPT will consult the river? (differences, similarities with own 
role) 
• Do you think TPT give a legal and transparent ‘human voice’ to the river? What 
other alternatives might there be or do you think were considered? (do you 
consider TAT as voiceless?)  
• What role would TPT (in representing TAT) have in shaping public opinion 
about TAT? 
 
3. Comparison and bigger picture rights of nature  
Goal: We want to know how certain concepts can be replicated within other cases of RON, 
politically representing nature and human-nature relations 
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• How do you think this law will change the way people around Whanganui (or 
New Zealand in general) look at Whanganui? 
• Do you see TAT as an example of environmental protection and strengthening 
Maori cultural justice/values going hand in hand or can give challenges? 
• How does TAT as a legal person affect the relationship that people have with 
nature? 
• Which challenges or possible problems do you foresee in representing the river 
in the future? 
• How do you think TAT serves as an example (both in NZ as worldwide) for 
environmental governance?  
• Do you think more natural entities should get the status of legal person in the 
future. Which criteria do you see fit? 
 
Other possible questions 
 
• How do you see Mātauranga Māori and Mātauranga Pakeha work together 
within the implementation of this Bill? 
• Do you think the way the representation of TAT is set up/formed could serve as 
an example for other natural entities? (both locally/globally)  
• Do you think certain activities on and around the river should not be permitted 
anymore as they could be against the river’s interest? (as the current legislation 
says ‘current activities on the river will not be affected by this Bill’)  
 
Extra questions for (co) appointer Te Pou Tupua from Parliament 
Goal: As he was involved in developing the legislation of giving personhood to the river, 
we want to know specifically from him how this process formed the representative 
construction as it is now and get an insight of why this has been selected to be ‘best’ way to 
do it 
 
• Can you describe your role within the TAT legislation process? 
• Could you explain how the different representative bodies of TAT have 
emerged; what were the reasons behind choosing representatives, strategy group 
and trust board? 
• Why did you choose X as one of the TPT? Can you describe her/his relation to 
the river (and its surrounding people?) 
• Do you think the legal personality concept can travel to other environmental 
areas in New Zealand? 
 
 
 
